A Three-Dimensional Model for the Use of Expert Psychiatric and Psychological Evidence in False Confession Defenses Before the Trier of Fact by Kastenberg, Major Joshua E.
A Three-Dimensional Model for the Use of Expert
Psychiatric and Psychological Evidence in False
Confession Defenses Before the Trier of Fact
Major Joshua E. Kastenberg*
INTRODUCTION
A substantial percentage of criminal trials involve confessions.
Empirical jury studies indicate reliance on confessions as evidence.1
However, not every confession is truthful or accurate. Indeed, some
confessions admitted into evidence have later been shown to be false.
A recent example of false confessions resulting in conviction occurred
with the highly publicized 1989 Central Park Jogger case in New
York, where five men were found guilty by a court and were only re-
cently exonerated.2 A social science of false confessions has developed
to address the issue of false confessions, yet its methodology is anecdo-
tal and incomplete. This Article examines both current law and con-
temporary studies of false confessions. Both a psychiatry-based
(medical model) and psychology-based (social model) approach is ana-
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1. See, e.g., Lissa Griffen, The Correction of Wrongful Convictions: A Comparative Perspec-
tive, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1241, 1249-50 (2001). Professor Griffen notes, "[O]f the DNA
exonerations studied by the Innocence Project at Cardozo Law School, twenty-three percent
were based on false confessions or admissions. Other studies show that seventy-three percent of
juries 'will vote to convict even when admissions have been repudiated by the defendant and
contradicted by physical evidence."' Id. at 1250 n.21 (citing JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD &
BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 92 (2000)). See also Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S.
Wrightsman, Coerced Confessions, Judicial Instructions, and Mock Juror Verdicts, 11 J. APPLIED
SOC. PSYCHOL. 489 (1981).
2. Central Park Shocker, D.A. to Recommend Tossing All Convictions, Dec. 4, 2002, at
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/us/DailyNews/centralpark-rape-021204.html.
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lyzed for admission of expert evidence. The analysis is presented in a
three-dimensional context. These dimensions include the concepts of
admissibility, the right to a complete defense, and the perpetual evolu-
tion of case law.
In criminal courts, a defendant has a variety of rights and options
regarding the prosecution's use of his confession. For instance, in a
pretrial hearing, the defendant is entitled to move for suppression of
evidence that is obtained by violating his or her constitutional rights.
These motions to suppress customarily involve issues of voluntariness,
such as the conditions under which the police obtained the confession.
Moreover, in many jurisdictions the defendant may challenge the vol-
untariness of the confession before the trier of fact at the time of trial.
However, once a judge determines a confession is admissible, the latter
course is unlikely, because the defendant is essentially admitting to the
facts in the confession while attacking police interrogation techniques.
Finally, for some time defendants have attempted to challenge the
credibility of confessions, in effect alleging that it was false and co-
erced.
Increasingly, defense challenges to voluntariness and credibility
of confessions have come through the use of expert psychology- and
psychiatry-based testimony. In some of these cases, the defendant
challenges the nature of the interrogation techniques used by the po-
lice. Experts testify, without providing specifics into the defendant's
state of mind, that the defendant's interrogation encompassed ele-
ments present in known false confession cases. In other cases, experts
may testify that the defendant has a character of malleability (sug-
gestibility) based on a specific mental illness. The thrust of these
cases is that the defendant is susceptible to suggestion and adopts as
his own the story suggested by the police.
Part I of this Article delineates a defendant's right to present vol-
untariness and credibility evidence against his or her confession. This
section analyzes the basic constitutional framework of how a defendant
can present this evidence and describes the traditional safeguards
against false confessions. This background information provides a
context for the overarching issue of expert testimony admissibility.
Part II provides a basic understanding of differences between the psy-
chiatric (medical model) and psychological (social model) approach to
false confessions. It then examines the types of false confession de-
fenses used by defendants and the interrogation techniques challenged
by defendants. Part III reviews the general rules of expert witness
admissibility under the Frye, Daubert, and Kumho Tire tests. The
question of expert witness admissibility hinges somewhat on how nar-
[Vol. 26:783
Expert Evidence in False Confession Defenses
rowly a jurisdiction's expert witness rules are interpreted. Part IV
then looks at a cross-section of state and federal cases dealing with the
admissibility of false confession testimony. In this section, jurisdic-
tions are divided into four categories based on whether they allow or
suppress such evidence. Some of these decisions also involve the scope
of rebuttal. Rebuttal evidence is of particular importance because few
courts (and fewer articles) have analyzed the issue. Finally, Part V
presents a hypothetical scenario, providing analytic context for the en-
tire Article. As a conclusion, this section also details what is required
to ensure a fair and impartial trial.'
I. CHALLENGING CONFESSIONS IN CRIMINAL LAW: THE RIGHT
TO CHALLENGE VOLUNTARINESS BEFORE THE TRIER OF LAW
AND TRIER OF FACT
A. Defining Voluntariness, Interrogation, and Custody: Basic Legal
Concepts
Prior to any discussion of a defendant's constitutional right to
challenge the credibility of his of her confession before the trier of fact,
it is helpful to briefly examine the twin issues of custody and interro-
gation. This is because the trier of fact does not determine the admis-
sibility of a confession. Once the trier of law admits a confession into
evidence, the trier of fact is charged with the task of weighing that evi-
dence by determining the amount of credibility it should be afforded.4
However, as in the case of any other testimonial or written evidence,
the defendant is not relegated to accepting its authenticity or truth. In
the realm of confessions, evidence reflecting issues of voluntariness be-
3. Black's Law Dictionary defines a fair and impartial trial as "a hearing by an impartial and
disinterested tribunal; a proceeding which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon in-
quiry, and renders judgment only after trial consideration or evidence and facts as a whole."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 596 (6th ed. 1990). The Dictionary cites case law for the proposi-
tion that a fair trial is "one where the accuser's legal rights are safeguarded and respected." Id.
The United States Supreme Court has also explored the meaning of a fair and impartial trial, as
seen in Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961), which stated the following:
More than one student of society has expressed the view that not the least significant
test of the quality of a civilization is its treatment of those charged with crime, par-
ticularly with offenses which arouse the passions of a community. One of the rightful
boasts of Western civilization is that the state has the burden of establishing guilt
solely on the basis of the evidence produced in court and under circumstances assur-
ing an accused all the safeguards of a fair trial.
Id. at 729 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
4. See, e.g., Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986).
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fore the trier of law are, if the defense so chooses, generally "fair
game" before the trier of fact.
A suspect's constitutional rights limit the extent of police inter-
rogation. For example, a suspect has the right to remain silent or seek
advice of counsel during a custodial interrogation.' Although custody
has not been defined per any one case, there are several factors used to
determine both actual and de facto custody.6 Some, but by no means
all, of these factors include the presence of probable cause to arrest,7
the subjective intent of the officers,8 the subjective belief of the ac-
cused,' the site and physical surroundings of the interrogation," the
confrontation of the suspect with evidence of guilt," the focus of the
investigation, 2 the language used to summon the accused,' 3 the dura-
tion and nature of the interrogation, 14 and whether the accused was
permitted to leave either during or following the interrogation.' 5 Most
of these factors are interrelated, in that faulty interrogations usually
contain multiple problems. Indeed, an overview of case law demon-
strates that reversal of a conviction is rare when only one of these fac-
tors is alleged to be in error.
Interrogation is defined as "questioning initiated by a law en-
forcement officer."' 6 There are forms of interrogation that do not in-
volve direct questioning. For example, in Rhode Island v. Innis,17 po-
lice accompanying a suspect in a law enforcement vehicle, who had
earlier asserted his right to silence, held a conversation between them-
selves.' The suspect then included himself in the conversation and
5. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The warnings mandated by Miranda only
come into play when the subject of the interrogation is "taken into custody, or otherwise de-
prived of his freedom of action in a significant way." Id. at 444.
6. See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
7. United States v. Alvarado-Garcia, 781 F.2d 422, 426 (1986).
8. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959).
9. United States v. Joe, 770 F. Supp. 607, 611 (D.N.M. 1991).
10. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494-95 (1977). In Mathiason, the fact that a sus-
pect voluntarily went to a police station did not render him in custody. Id. See also, United
States v. Beraun-Panez, 812 F.2d 578 (9th Cir. 1987); McCown v. Callahan, 726 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.
1984).
11. Quartararo v. Mantello, 715 F. Supp. 449 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
12. United States v. Cotton, 223 F. Supp. 2d 1039 (D. Neb. 2002).
13. United States v. Booth, 669 F.2d 1231 (9th Cir. 1981).
14. United States v. Harrell, 894 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1990).
15. Cruz v. Miller, 255 F.3d 777 (2d Cir. 2001).
16. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
17. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
18. Id. at 294-95. Innis was initially suspected of robbing a taxi driver at gunpoint. He
was arrested while walking on a street and taken into custody. After being notified of his rights
under Miranda, he told the arresting officers he wanted to speak to an attorney. He was placed
in a patrol car and taken to the police station by other officers who "were instructed not to ques-
tion or intimidate him in any way." During the drive to the police station, one of the officers
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actually inculpated himself.'9 Although the trial court found the con-
fession voluntary, the confession was challenged on appeal.2° While
the Court acknowledged that the term "interrogation," expands be-
yond the limits of formal questioning, it determined that the confes-
sion was voluntary. 2' There are a variety of instances where the func-
tional equivalent of formal questioning comes under special scrutiny,
such as undercover police questioning 2 and exigent circumstances. 21
However, such scrutiny does not automatically result in suppression,
and in most instances, good faith by the police will overcome a defen-
dant's objection to admissibility. 24
In theory, once a constitutional right is invoked, all questioning
of the suspect must cease. 25 Likewise, a law enforcement agent must
notify a suspect of these rights within a reasonable amount of time af-
ter placing the suspect in custody. 26 However, if the suspect does not
invoke his right to remain silent, law enforcement agents are permitted
to question a suspect with only a few limitations, such as not using co-
ercion and duress.27 For instance, law enforcement agents may embel-
lish the state of evidence against a suspect. 28 Likewise, a variety of
ruses and trickery is permitted in various jurisdictions. 9 As a result, a
"science" of interrogations has developed.3" Generally, embellish-
ments and ruses in interrogation techniques will not preclude a confes-
said that "there were a lot of handicapped children running around in this area because a school
for such children was located nearby." The officer further stated, "God forbid one of them
might find a weapon and hurt themselves." Id.
19. Id. at 295. On hearing the conversation between the officers, Innis interrupted and told
the officers he would take them to the location of the shotgun used in the robbery. Id.
20. Id. at 296-97.
21. Id. The Innis Court reasoned as follows:
[T]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected
to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term "in-
terrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any
words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to ar-
rest and custody).
Id. at 300-01. The Court concluded that Innis had not been interrogated because there was no
express questioning or its functional equivalent. Id. at 302.
22. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990).
23. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
24. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969).
25. E.g., Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 182 (1953). In Stein, the Court held that while
there is a per se rule against confessions obtained by physical violence, no per se rule exists when
the confession was obtained by psychological coercion. Id. at 184.
26. See United States v. Chamberlain, 163 F.3d 499 (8th Cir. 1998).
27. Stein, 346 U.S. at 184.
28. Amaya-Ruiz v. Stewart, 121 F.3d 486 (9th Cir. 1997).
29. See, e.g., Shedelbower v. Estelle, 885 F.2d 570 (7th Cir. 1992); State v. Kelekolio, 849
P.2d 58 (Haw. 1993).
30. See, e.g., FRED INBAU & JOHN REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND
CONFESSIONS (3d ed. 1986).
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sion's admissibility. 3' This is because courts have usually accepted
that some artifice, deceit, or trickery is valid in obtaining a confes-
sion. 32  However, when a trial judge determines the issue of
admissibility in the voluntariness context, the defendant can raise the
confession credibility defense before the trier of fact.
B. Confession Corroboration Rule
Even when proper interrogation procedures are utilized, a confes-
sion alone is not enough to sustain a conviction.3 3 A confession must
also be sufficiently corroborated by other evidence to be deemed reli-
able, though it is not necessary that the prosecution corroborate every
element of the charged offense. 34 Rather, the prosecution must show
by independent evidence that the confession is sufficiently reliable to
be truthful.
The corroboration rule existed before the widespread use of ex-
pert witnesses in criminal trials, 35 and was intended at common law
and today to protect against police zeal or other manifest injustice."
For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that where a full confession
dominates the government's proof, it is fair to assume that the trier of
fact will interpret its duty to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to
mean that it cannot simply accept a confession at face value.37 Like-
wise, most states have adopted the common law rule of corroboration,
but have done so in varying forms.38 It is a basic premise that the
more a confession's details are corroborated by independent facts, the
less likely the confession given is false.39 Some adherents of false con-
fession psychology believe the corroboration rule tends to be sub-
31. See, e.g., Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far is Too Far?,
99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1174-77 (2001); 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 6.2(a), at 447 (2d ed. 1999).
32. E.g., Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044 (7th Cir. 1992); People v. Mann, 333
N.E.2d 467 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
33. E.g., Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954).
34. See, e.g., United States v. Singleterry, 29 F.3d 733, 736-38 (1st Cir. 1998).
35. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 489 (1963) (stating that the confession cor-
roboration rule has a long-rooted history).
36. See, e.g., Singleterry, 29 F.3d at 738.
37. D'Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338, 357 (9th Cir. 1951).
38. See, e.g., People v. Jones, 949 P.2d 890 (Cal. 1998); Nelson v. Delaware, 123 A.2d 859
(Del. 1956); Ballard v. State, 636 A.2d 474 (Md. 1994); Commonwealth v. Manning, 668 N.E.2d
850 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996); State v. Fry, 42 P.3d 369, 370-72 (Or. Ct. App. 2001); State v.
Weller, 644 A.2d 839 (Vt. 1994); State v. Aten, 927 P.2d 210, 217-19 (Wash. 1996).
39. See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990); Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A.
Leo, The Social Psychology of Police Interrogation: The Theory and Classification of True and False
Confessions, 16 STUD. IN L., POL. AND SOC'Y 189, 238 (1997); Corey J. Ayling, Corroborating
Confessions: An Empirical Analysis of Legal Safeguards Against False Confessions, 1984 WIS. L.
REV. 1121,1186-87 (1984).
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verted by police interrogation procedures.4" This is because, on occa-
sion, police are suspected of feeding details of a crime to a compliant
41suspect.
C. Constitutional Right to Present General Evidence Regarding the
Credibility of a Confession, and Evidentiary Limitations
In Jackson v. Denno,42 the Supreme Court held that issues of ad-
missibility are solely within the province of the trial judge.43 Thus, a
jury is generally not permitted to hear a confession prior to the judge
determining its admissibility. The Court's reasoning for its rule rested
in part on the belief that once a confession is heard, it is difficult to
keep the facts of the confession out of jurors' minds during delibera-
tions.44 However, after Denno some jurisdictions were reticent to per-
mit the trier of fact to determine the credibility of a confession. The
Court laid this issue to rest in Crane v. Kentucky, when it decided that
the issue of credibility is solely within the discretion of the jury.4" The
facts and holding of Crane are, for the purpose of this Article, worth
noting because some of the features of Crane's confession, such as his
age and the amount of time spent in interrogation, become central is-
sues to a claim of false confession.
In early August 1981, a liquor store clerk was murdered, and the
police seemed unable to link this offense with any suspect.46 Crane, a
sixteen-year-old male, was initially arrested for suspected participationin an unrelated crime. 47 Although he denied murdering the liquor
store clerk, he confessed to a number of other unsolved offenses.48
40. Ayling, supra note 39, at 1186-87.
41. Id.
42. 378 U.S. 368 (1964). Prior to Denno, some states permitted the jury to determine ad-
missibility of confessions. Thus, even where the jury determined a confession violated due proc-
ess, the jurors still reviewed the evidence. See, e.g., JOSEPH G. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED 262 (3d ed. 1996).
43. Denno, 378 U.S. at 389. The court's reasoning for prohibiting the practice of permit-
ting a trier of fact to consider voluntariness was as follows:
It is difficult, if not impossible, to prove that a confession which a jury has found to be
involuntary has nevertheless influenced the verdict or that its finding of voluntariness,
if this is the course it took, was affected by the other evidence showing the confession
was true. But the New York procedure poses substantial threats to a defendant's con-
stitutional rights to have an involuntary confession entirely disregarded and to have
the coercion issue fairly and reliably determined. These hazards we cannot ignore.
Id.
44. Id.
45. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 688-89 (1986).
46. Id. at 684-85.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 684. The Court appeared to disbelieve the police officers' version of events,
which was that the defendant began confessing "just out of the clear blue sky." Id.
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During a lengthy interrogation, police transferred Crane from a police
station to a juvenile detention facility.49 At trial, the judge found the
confession admissible and prevented the defense from presenting evi-
dence to the trier of fact concerning the conditions of Crane's interro-
gation, which the defense hoped would illustrate that the confession
lacked credibility.5" The suppressed credibility evidence would have
been presented in the form of testimony by the defendant rather than
through expert evidence.
The Supreme Court held that the trial judge violated Crane's
Sixth Amendment right to present a complete defense. 2 The Court
reasoned that the confession credibility evidence was admissible be-
cause "certain interrogation techniques, either in isolation, or as ap-
plied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offen-
sive to a civilized system of justice, that they must be condemned." 3
Thus, both voluntariness and credibility are partly for the trier of fact
to decide, should the defendant elect to present this evidence.
One result of Crane is that, subject to rules of evidence, condi-
tions surrounding the taking of a confession are admissible. There is
wide evidentiary latitude under Crane because the very elements per-
mitted in interrogations, such as deceit, trickery, and embellishment,
become admissible to the jury if the defendant wishes. Indeed, the
Court held that even after a confession is deemed voluntary, evidence
concerning the "physical and psychological environment that yielded
the confession can also be of substantial relevance to the ultimate fac-
tual issue of a defendant's guilt or innocence.""
Since Crane, courts have further clarified the limits of a defen-
dant's right to present evidence. For instance, in Taylor v. Illinois, the
Court acknowledged that a defendant does not have the unfettered
right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise
inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.5 Although evidentiary
rules are analyzed in greater detail below, one of the most salient cases
regarding the limitations of Crane-namely, United States v. Schef-
fer56-- deals with the use of expert testimony.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 685.
51. Id. at 684.
52. Id. at 690-92.
53. Id. at 687 (citing Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985)).
54. Id. at 689.
55. Taylor v. Illinios, 484 U.S. 400, 410 (1988).
56. 523 U.S. 303 (1998).
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In Scheffer, an Air Force court martial suppressed exculpatory
polygraph results that were offered by the defense.57 The trial judge,
in suppressing the evidence, relied on Military Rule of Evidence
(MRE) 707, which expressly prohibits such evidence from courts-
martial.5 8 The trial judge held that polygraph results were not suffi-
ciently reliable to constitute relevant evidence. 9 On appeal, the Air
Force Court of Criminal Appeals upheld Scheffer's conviction, but the
Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces-the senior military appellate
court-reversed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.6°
The Court began its analysis by reviewing Taylor v. Illinois,6
Rock v. Arkansas,62 Chambers v. Mississippi,63 and Washington v.
Texas.64 In each of these cases, limitations on the right to a complete
defense were reviewed and reversed. However, each of these cases in-
volved lay witness testimony, as opposed to expert testimony. The
Scheffer Court then recognized that federal and state governments
have a legitimate interest in "ensuring [that] reliable evidence is pre-
sented to the trier of fact."6 The Court also noted that "to this day,
the scientific community remains extremely polarized about the reli-
ability of polygraph techniques." 66 The Court treated MRE 707 as
being consistent with the general rule in favor of preserving the trier of
fact's function of making credibility determinations during criminal
trials.67 Thus, the rules of evidence are partly designed to prohibit
anything that encroaches on the trier of fact's function as the only lie
57. United States v. Scheffer, 41 M.J. 683, 685 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995). Scheffer was
convicted of (1) wrongful use of methamphetamine, in violation of Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) Art. 11 2a, and (2) absenting himself from his unit without authority, in violation
of UCMJ Art. 84. Id.
58. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308. MRE 707 reads, in pertinent part, "notwithstanding any
other provision of law, the results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of the polygraph ex-
aminer, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or the taking of a polygraph examina-
tion, shall not be admitted into evidence." Id. (citing MIL. R. EVID. 707).
59. Id. at 307.
60. Id. at 307-08.
61. 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
62. 483 U.S. 44 (1987). In Rock, the Court reviewed Arkansas' blanket exclusion of all
"hypnotically refreshed testimony." While the court did not strike down the prohibition, it did
so where it excluded the defendant from testifying to her version of the case. Id. at 62.
63. 410 U.S. 284 (1973). In Chambers, the Court invalidated a prohibition against a party
impeaching its own witness, as well as an exclusion of the testimony of three witnesses hearing
the defendant's confession. Id. at 298, 302.
64. 388 U.S. 14 (1967). In Washington, the Court invalidated a Texas evidentiary rule that
prohibited codefendants from testifying in support of each other. Id. at 23.
65. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 309. The Court then conducted an overview of both Daubert and
FRE 702, FRE 802, and FRE 901. Id.
66. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 309.
67. Id. at 312.
Seattle University Law Review
detector in the courtroom.68 The Court then concluded that there is
nothing unconstitutional about a per se rule prohibiting a specific type
of highly unreliable evidence. 9 For the purposes of this Article,
Scheffer is important because it permits the trier of law to exclude, on
the basis of unreliability, otherwise relevant evidence.
D. Must the Defendant First Testify?
For expert evidence to be admissible, it must be at least some-
what relevant.7 Additionally, although some evidence is relevant, it
may be too remote or tenuous for admissibility unless other admitted
evidence renders it unlikely to confuse issues before the trier of fact or
to cause a waste of time.71
While a defendant has a right to remain silent, it is possible that
this exercise, in some situations, would extinguish the relevance of ei-
ther social model- or medical model-based false confession evidence.
7 2
However, it is more likely the case that social model-based false con-
fession evidence should be foreclosed by a defendant's failure to tes-
tify. Certainly, this could become the case where witnesses to the con-
fession do not testify as to a coercive nature of the confession. It may
be, for the purposes of both admissibility and preservation of a merito-
rious appeal, that the accused must testify that he (1) felt his will over-
come by the interrogation, and (2) did not commit the offenses al-
leged. Even under the medical model, when the accused's confession
is supported by corroborating facts such as fingerprints, eyewitness
testimony, or other forensic evidence, the only means to establish rele-
vancy may be through the defendant testifying.
Defense attorneys understand the potential pitfalls of having a
client testify. For example, when the defendant testifies, he becomes
subject to cross-examination. Therefore, statements that may have
been previously suppressed by the trial court become admissible as a
result of the defendant's testimony. The defendant has likely made
inconsistent statements to others in the course of interviews, interroga-
tions, or discussions with inmates or coworkers. Such inconsistent
68. Id. at 313.
69. Id. at 315.
70. See FED. R. EVID. 401, which provides as follows: "Relevant evidence means evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence."
71. See FED. R. EVID. 403, which states as follows: "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, con-
fusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
72. See, e.g., People v. Pecoraro, 677 N.E.2d 875 (I11. 1997).
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statements may make the defendant's veracity suspect in the eyes of
the trier of fact. In some jurisdictions, the prosecution may even pre-
sent evidence of the defendant's character for untruthfulness because
the defendant's credibility is at issue once he has testified.73
In People v. Pecoraro, the Illinois Supreme Court held that for
false confession expert testimony to be admissible, the defendant
would have to first testify as to his personal condition prior to his in-
terrogation.74 The defendant in Pecoraro I voluntarily told a police of-
ficer that he committed a murder.7" At trial, the defense moved to
suppress his confession on grounds that the confession resulted from
the defendant's ingestion of substantial quantities of drugs and alcohol
prior to confessing. 6 On appeal, Pecoraro raised a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel for failing to introduce expert psychology testi-
mony as to his neurological condition during his interrogation.7 The
court did not find that the failure to present the psychologist's opinion
was prejudicial because the expert's testimony would likely have been
inadmissible. On habeas review, the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois78 held that in order for an expert psychologist to tes-
tify as to Pecoraro's heightened sense of suggestibility, Pecoraro would
have had to first testify, which he did not do during the guilt phase of
the trial. 9 The Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court's rationale in
Pecoraro v. Walls,80 when it held that the facts of Pecoraro's condition
and perceptions needed to "be gotten into the record for expert testi-
mony premised on them to be admissible."81
73. See FED. R. EVID. 608, 609.
74. 677 N.E.2d 875 (Ill. 1997) [hereinafter Pecoraro I].
75. Id. at 879. On December 8, 1982, the body of one Jimmy Christian was discovered in a
parked car. He had been killed as a result of being shot in the chest. Originally, the police sus-
pected Pecoraro, and they interviewed him, but they were unable to connect him to the killing.
On August 6, 1986, Pecoraro stopped a police officer and confessed to the murder, claiming he
wanted to "clear his chest." Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 891. It should be noted that police officers testified they were unaware Pecoraro
was under the influence of alcohol or drugs during his statement of guilt. However, at the sup-
pression hearing a defense witness testified that at some time prior to Pecoraro's arrest, he saw
Pecoraro consume over six beers and 1.25 grams of cocaine. In the same hearing, Pecoraro testi-
fied he was under the influence of alcohol and cocaine. Id.
78. United States ex rel. Pecoraro v. Page, 169 F. Supp. 2d 815 (N.D. Ill. 2001) [hereinafter
Pecoraro II ).
79. Id.
80. 286 F.3d 439 (7th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter Pecoraro III ].
81. Id. at 446.
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E. Concluding Remarks to Part I
Even before analyzing the two models of false confession studies
or interrogation techniques, a complex array of issues arises regarding
the use of lay testimony to challenge confessions before the trier of
fact. A confession may be challenged through the defendant's own
testimony or through the cross-examination of police witnesses. Nev-
ertheless, the trier of fact still has the confession as evidence. Some
believe that without other evidence-like expert evidence-the trier of
fact may view the confession uncritically. 2
II. FALSE CONFESSIONS: SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT, TYPES,
THEORIES, AND APPROACHES
A. Psychiatry and Psychology: Brief Overview of Two Models
Before proceeding, a brief contextual note must be made regard-
ing the differences between psychiatrists and psychologists because, in
some cases, these differences have significance in this Article's analysis
and conclusions. While there is a tendency to simplify the differences
between the two fields, these differences may become key in admissi-
bility determinations. A tension exists between the two fields in terms
of expert qualifications in testimony regarding issues such as malle-
ability, future dangerousness, and the like. 3 The difference between
the two fields is problematic in determining expert qualifications for
false confession testimony. A psychiatrist is a physician, either allo-
pathic (M.D.) or osteopathic (D.O.), who specializes in the study and
treatment of mental disorders.8 4 A psychologist is, according to some
82. Ayling, supra note 39, at 1180. However, Ayling was unconvinced in the trier of fact's
absolute reliance on confessions. See id. (citing KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY
172-74 (1966)). Kalven and Zeisel found that the evidence was "inconclusive as to whether con-
fessions have any impact on judge-jury disagreement." Id. at 174. Although they later specu-
lated that "the jury may not so much consider the credibility of the confession as the impropriety
of the method by which it was obtained," they offered no statistical evidence to prove this or to
show that judges were less swayed by such impropriety. See id. at 320.
83. DANIEL W. SHUMAN, PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE 8-2 (2000).
Shuman writes, "Although less so than in years past, the cases addressing the minimum thresh-
old qualifications for experts on questions of mental disorder still frequently favor psychiatrists'
testimony and disfavor psychologists' testimony." Id. (citing Dix & Poythress, Propriety of
Medical Dominance of Forensic Mental Health Practice: The Empirical Evidence, 23 ARIZ. L. REV.
961 (1981); Yamey & Popiel, Judged Value of Medical Versus Psychological Expert Witnesses, 11
INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 195 (1988); Comment, The Psychologist as Expert Witness: Science in
the Courtroom, 38 MD. L. REV. 539 (1979)).
84. SHUMAN, supra note 83, at 4-2. Regarding psychiatry as a science, Shuman writes:
Although it is common among the lay populace to think of the birth of psychiatry in
conjunction with Sigmund Freud's work in Vienna in the late nineteenth century,
Benjamin Rush, a physician in colonial Philadelphia, is considered the father of
[Vol. 26:783
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writers, "a person who is trained to study and measure mental proc-
esses, and to diagnose and treat mental disorders.""5 Moreover, there
are significant differences in the training and educational backgrounds
of the two professions, and most, if not all, states have separate licens-
ing boards.86 Even within each field, there are subfields such as clini-
cal 7 and forensic" in the case of psychology, and forensic" and child
and adolescent9" in the case of psychiatry. Additionally, each field and
subfield is advised, and to an extent, governed by various boards and
certification programs.9' Because of the differences in training and
practice, psychiatrists tend to testify on the basis of a "medical
model," also referred to as the "disease model," while psychologists
tend to testify on the basis of a "social model."92
At trial, there is a tendency to favor psychiatrist over psycholo-
gist testimony regarding mental illness.9" For example, a psychologist
American psychiatry. Rush was a pioneer in the treatment of the mentally ill and
wrote the first American psychiatric texts, in which he classified insanity as a brain
disease.
Id.
85. Id. (citing Laliotis & Grayson, Psychologist Heal Thyself, 40 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 34
(1985)).
86. Id. at 4-2.
87. Id. at 4-19.
88. Id. at 4-19. Forensic psychology is a subspecialty in psychology that relates psycho-
logical knowledge to legal problems. Id.
89. Id. at 4-10. Forensic psychiatry is a subspecialty in psychiatry that relates psychiatric
knowledge to legal problems. Id.
90. Id. Child and adolescent psychiatry is a subspecialty in psychiatry whose practitioners
are trained in the diagnosis and treatment of mental disorders in children and adolescents. Id.
91. Id.
92. Dress Aldrege Grangetto, Reducing Recidivism by Substance Abusers Who Commit Drug
and Alcohol Related Crimes, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 383, 389 (1999). Grangetto aptly
explains as follows:
The disease model associates mental disorders with brain dysfunction and uses medi-
cation or somatic intervention to treat the affliction. The psychoanalytic model con-
siders adult disorders to be the result of childhood trauma and uses psychotherapy as
the treatment of choice. Behavioral models view maladaptive behavior as learned re-
sponses to past events and treat the behavior through conditioning and reinforcement.
Social models regard mental disorders as the result of social disorders that are treated
through reorganizing the person's social system. Modem treatment programs com-
bine aspects of various treatment approaches to achieve the best results.
Id.; see also Charles A. Kaufman & Daniel R. Weinberger, The Neurological Basis of Psychiatric
Disability, in PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITY: CLINICAL, LEGAL, AND ADMINISTRATIVE
DIMENSIONS 23 (Arthur T. Meyerson & Theodora Fine eds., 1987). Authors Kaufman and
Weinberger state the following: "Disability may be defined as a functional limitation, imposed
by disease, on capacities necessary for independent living and economic self-sufficiency...
Many patients with psychiatric illnesses, however, are equally limited, especially in their capaci-
ties for selfl-]care and selfl-]direction." Id.
93. SHUMAN, supra note 83, at 8-12; see also Renee Romkens, Ambiguous Responsibilities:
Law and Conflicting Expert Testimony on the Abused Woman Who Shot Her Husband, 25 LAW &
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is generally not permitted to testify about neurological examinations.94
In several jurisdictions, psychologists are permitted to testify about
the results of psychological testing but are limited in the conclusions
to which they may testify.9" For instance, on the issue of mental state
at the time of an offense, a psychologist may testify to the results of
psychological tests administered, but may not be permitted to suggest
whether those results indicated the defendant's sanity at the time of an
offense." A psychiatrist would, however, be permitted to offer an
opinion of sanity based on the same evidence.97 There are, of course,
criticisms of these distinctions.
The courts' preference for a "medical model" of mental illness is
under challenge by the psychological community.9" Critics of the
preference argue that because both psychiatrists and psychologists rely
primarily on behavioral theories (rather than organic and biological
disorders) for their testimony, there should be no distinction between
the two." For the purpose of this Article, the distinction between the
medical model and social model is more important than that between
psychology and psychiatry. However, while the thesis of this Article
is premised on the supremacy of the medical model in assessing and
admitting false confession evidence, this Article does not argue that
only psychiatrists should be permitted to testify. As with any area of
expert testimony, courts must be on guard to prevent bogus, irrele-
vant, or unfounded testimony. 100
B. Interrogation Techniques
Police interrogation techniques have become more sophisticated
and frequently involve principles of human behavior and experimental
data reported in psychology literature.' Many city police depart-
SOC. INQUIRY 355, 382-3 n.35 (2000). According to Romkens, favoring psychiatric over psy-
chological evidence occurs in Western Europe as well. See id.
It may likely be the case that this favoritism is a result of psychology testing being largely based
on the defendant examinee. This makes psychological tests vulnerable. See, e.g., JAY ZISKIN,
COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 669 (5th ed. 1995).
94. SHUMAN, supra note 83, at 8-12.
95. Id.




100. See, e.g., Steven A. Ormish, A Blizzard of Lies: Bogus Psychiatric Defenses, 22 AM. J.
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 19 (2001). Ormish writes that psychiatric defenses are sometimes prof-
fered when no other viable defense is available. Id. at 20. Likewise, this is the case for psychol-
ogy evidence as well. Id.
101. Howard B. Terrell & William Logan, The False Confession: Manipulative Interrogation
of the Mentally Disordered Criminal Suspect, 13 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 29 (1992).
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ments maintain their own behavioral science components, placing
psychology in the service of criminal detection.102 Not surprisingly,
about eighty percent of all criminal cases involve a confession. °3 Al-
though several techniques exist, it is helpful to study one of the more
widely used interrogation techniques.
In 1954, two employees of the Chicago Police Scientific Crime
Detection Laboratory (CPSCDL), Professor Fred E. Inbau and Mr.
John J. Reid, published a study titled Criminal Interrogation and Con-
fessions."4 The study consisted of a compilation of techniques based
on case studies for police in obtaining truthful confessions. As a result
of Miranda v. Arizona in 1967, Inbau and Reid published a second
edition. While there are several studies and police information guides
in the field of interrogations, Inbau and Reid's work gained enough
prominence to become almost universal. Indeed, Inbau and Reid have
published two further editions plus several other documents and stud-
ies regarding police interrogations.
The purpose for discussing in detail the work of Inbau and Reid
in this Article is threefold. First, their work is widely accepted in law
enforcement.' However, it must be noted that while many law en-
forcement investigators are trained in what has become known as the
"Reid technique," they often employ their own modifications. Sec-
ond, there is a growing body of case law where experts have been prof-
fered and, in some cases, permitted to testify as to the perceived flaws
in the Reid technique. Finally, Inbau and Reid's studies span a large
tract of time. This Article focuses on Inbau and Reid's second edition
and, to a lesser extent, their most current edition. 10 6
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. FRED E. INBAU & JOHN J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS i
(1967). At the time of publication of the second edition in 1967, Reid was the director of his own
corporation, John J. Reid & Associates, while Inbau was Professor of Law at Northwestern Uni-
versity. Id.
105. See, e.g., Saul M. Kassin, Effective Screening for Truth Telling: Is it Possible? Human
Judges of Truth, Deception and Credibility: Confident But Erroneous, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 809
(2002). Kassin writes that the technique has trained more than 150,000 law enforcement officers.
Id. at 812.
106. FRED E. INBAU, JOHN J. REID & JOSEPH P. BUCKLEY, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION
AND CONFESSIONS (3d ed. 1987) [hereinafter Third Edition]. Note that one significant differ-
ence between the second and third editions was the addition of a brief chapter on the interroga-
tion of juvenile suspects. Also, in the Third Edition, Inbau and Reid mold their earlier guidance
into a nine-step process. The Third Edition's nine-step process places greater emphasis on
theme development. That is, interrogators are advised to develop themes likely to result in a
guilty suspect's confession response. Suggested themes include minimizing the moral serious-
ness of the offense, condemning the victim or accomplice, and having the suspect place himself
or herself at the scene of the offense. Id. Special themes were added for juvenile offenders as
well. These included placing blame on parents, and the uncertainty experienced by teenagers.
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Criminal Interrogation and Confessions suggests several steps for
planning and conducting effective interrogations. 1 7 Suspects are di-
vided by social class. Additionally, the conditions of the confession
room and preliminary preparations are noted. For instance, Inbau and
Reid recommend privacy in the interrogation room, devoid of distrac-
tions such as telephones, vents, windows, and pictures."' They even
suggest types of lighting to maximize observance of the suspect with-
out providing the suspect either a high degree of comfort or excessive
discomfort.0 9 In terms of preliminary preparation for interrogation,
the authors suggest a variety of tasks: knowing as much as possible
about the victim and the suspect; the social, religious, and racial atti-
tudes of the suspect; potentials for alibi evidence; and the suspect's
education level." The deportment of the interrogator is perhaps most
important to the Inbau and Reid technique. First and foremost, the
authors advise police to avoid creating the impression that the interro-
gator is a detective, but rather is a person "merely seeking the
truth.""' Additionally, Inbau and Reid recommend such tactics as
treating a subject with decency and respect, provided that the investi-
gator remains in a position of authority."' Thus, they suggest calling
professional, highly educated suspects by their first names while ad-
dressing working class or unemployed persons as "Mr." or "Mrs."1 3
Id. at 137-40. Additionally, schematics of a model confession room were included in the Third
Edition. Id. at 31-34.
107. Various steps are noted in both the second and third editions.
108. INBAU & REED, supra note 104, at 11-12. Inbau and Reid did make room for the
possibility of a "two-way" mirror. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 14. This is not an all-encompassing list, and the authors suggest learning as
much as possible about the suspect and victim, including sexual habits, hobbies, possible mo-
tives, and physical and mental condition. Id.
111. Id. In the second edition, the authors devote twelve specific points over seven pages to
different types of suspects. Id. at 17-23. For instance, in point 4, they suggest the following:
The interrogator should sit fairly close to the subject, and between the two there
should be no table, desk, or other piece of furniture. Distance or the presence of an
obstruction of any sort constitutes a serious psychological barrier and also affords the
subject a certain degree of relief and confidence not otherwise attainable. As to
the psychological validity of the above suggested seating arrangement, reference may be
made to the commonplace but yet meaningful expressions such as "getting next" to a
person, or the "buttonholing" of a customer by a salesman.
Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
112. Id. at 19-22. The authors note:
The interrogator should always be mindful of the fact that regardless of the kind of
crime a person has committed, he is nevertheless a human being and will probably be
reacting to the interrogation in much the same way as would the interrogator himself
if their situations were reversed. It is a mistake, therefore, to look upon the suspect as
an animal, even though his offense may be a very brutal sexual assault or killing.
Id. at 23.
113. Id. at20
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Reid and Inbau further recommend that investigators temper their
language to the type used by the suspect. They also advise to conceal
any resentment or surprise when catching a suspect in a lie." 4
Reid and Inbau's initial studies were fairly detailed and multidi-
mensional. The advice proffered included classifying suspects into
emotional offenders and nonemotional offenders, as well as suspects
whose guilt was reasonably certain versus those whose guilt was
doubtful or uncertain."' Within this multidimensional context, Inbau
and Reid created a twenty-six point interlocking thematic approach to
interrogations and added a section entitled "General Suggestions Re-
garding the Interrogation of Criminal Suspects." At no time did In-
bau and Reid suggest the use of violence, or even the threat of vio-
lence, to obtain a confession. This is likely because in police studies, it
was found that violence or the threat of violence could lead to false
confessions." 6
In the 1967 (second) edition, the twenty-six points included such
basic tactics as pointing out the possibility that a victim has lied or ex-
aggerated the nature of an offense." 7 In some cases, Reid and Inbau
advise sympathizing with the suspect by condemning the victim or ac-
complice, if any." 8 One of the frequently attacked concepts is the ad-
vice to "suggest [for the purpose of a socially revolting offense] a less
revolting and more morally acceptable motivation or reason for the of-
fense.""' 9  One basic suggestion is to call attention to a suspect's
physical condition as a psychological sign of guilt. 2 The Third Edi-
tion adds little to these interrogation tactics.
114. Id. at 22.
115. Id. at 24. Reid and Inbau defined emotional offenders as those who committed crimes
against persons, such as assault, rape, and murder, for nonfinancial reasons. That is, persons
who committed crimes for nonfinancial reasons tended to have a greater likelihood of a "troubled
conscience." Nonemotional offenders were primarily defined as those who committed crimes for
financial gain, although some of these persons committed violent offenses to gain money. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 64.
118. Id. at 47.
119. Id. at 43. Inbau and Reid suggest allowing a suspect to save face by letting him base
an admission of guilt upon a motivation or reason that is less offensive than the real motivation of
his act. Another companion technique is to reduce the suspect's guilt feeling by minimizing the
moral seriousness of his offense. Id. at 40.
120. Id. at 33. On this subject, Reid and Inbau state as follows:
An offender who is led to believe that his appearance and demeanor are betraying him
is thereby placed in a much more vulnerable position. His belief that he is exhibiting
symptoms of guilt has the effect of destroying or diminishing his confidence in his
ability to deceive and tends to convince him of the futility or further resistance.
Id. Some of the features Reid and Inbau suggest are counterintuitive. For example, they note
that pointing out to a suspect an inability to look the interviewer in the eye is counterproductive.
Likewise, where a suspect claims to be a "religious man" or have a "spotless past record," he
2003]
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The Reid technique is not without its critics in both the psycho-
logical field as well as the criminal law community. 21  Likewise, some
federal and state courts have occasioned to comment on the Reid tech-
nique. Some courts found nothing inherently coercive about its utili-
zation.1 22 Other courts have viewed the technique as psychologically
coercive, but not meriting suppression of a confession.' 23
C. False Confession Theories
1. The Medical Model: Analysis and Limitations
A medical model of false confessions is premised on the condi-
tion that a suspect (1) is encumbered by a biological mental disease,
and (2) the mental disease is likely to be a contributing factor in adopt-
ing the suggestiveness of the interrogation. 124 Unlike the social model,
the medical model presents evidence directly related to the defen-
should be countered with a stronger confrontation of guilt. For instance, the following forceful
phrase is suggested:
I don't care how religious you are, and I don't care how spotless your record is. The
fact that you are dragging your religion into this and giving me this business about
your spotless record is an effort to make your story sound convincing. The only thing
that's going to be convincing to me is when you start telling the truth.
Id. at 37.
121. Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: Depriva-
tions of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 428, 496 n.30 (1998). Leo and Ofshe specifically write:
American police interrogation training manuals also fail to advise police of the social
psychology of false confessions or instruct them how to recognize when their tactics
are leading an innocent suspect to falsely confess. In short, police text writers and in-
terrogation trainers demonstrate a studied indifference to the extensive psychological
literature on false confessions.
Id.
122. See, e.g., State v. Ulch, 2002 WL 597397, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2002).
123. See, e.g., State v. Gevan, 2002 WL 2005441, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 3, 2002).
The Gevan court noted:
Common elements of the Reid technique are the officer (1) maintaining privacy with
the defendant; (2) positing guilt of the suspect as fact with questions that seek to un-
derstand why the crime was committed; (3) minimizing the moral seriousness of the
crime; (4) exhibiting confidence in the ability to get a confession; and (5) blaming the
victim or society at large.
Id. The court further commented on the Reid technique by stating that "these tactics are de-
signed to put the subject in a psychological state where his story is but an elaboration of what the
police purport to know already-that he is guilty. Explanations to the contrary are dismissed
and discouraged." Id. However, it must be noted that the use of the Reid technique was not the
reason for the court's determination in upholding the trial court's suppression of evidence.
Rather, the reason for the suppression was that detectives failed to provide the suspect with a
Miranda warning, and the investigator called himself an "advocate" for the suspect. Id.
124. See GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS,
CONFESSIONS, AND TESTIMONY 32 (1992).
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dant. 12' For instance, a moderately retarded suspect may begin to
adopt suggestions as to his guilt because this adaptation is a normal
feature of the biological illness afflicting the suspect.126
One of the difficulties in accepting a medical model of false con-
fessions rests in the initial voluntariness test. Adherents of the medi-
cal model may argue that if a person afflicted with a mental illness
confesses during an interrogation, the confession is not the product of
rational intellect and free will. But mental illness, in and of itself, de-
notes a high standard of proof. One need only look at the high stan-
dard of proof for insanity,"' There are myriad cases, for instance,
where a court recognizes a mental illness affliction, yet finds a confes-
sion voluntary.128 Indeed, questions of mental illness often become
relegated to losing issues of voluntariess. 129
An example of the medical model's usage and perceived short-
comings can be seen in United States v. Raymer."3° In that case, Ray-
mer, while serving a sentence in a Kentucky State penitentiary for
robbery, sent threatening mail to his probation officer.' As a result
of this action, an FBI agent interviewed Raymer in the penitentiary
hospital after providing a Miranda warning. 132 Raymer was a patient
in the hospital for lacerating himself and eating metal wire. 133 During
this interview, Raymer confessed to sending the threatening letters. 134
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See SHUMAN, supra note 83, at 12-8-12-10.
128. See, e.g., Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
129. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 169-71. In Connelly, the defendant traveled from Boston to
Denver and told a police officer he committed murder. Id. at 160. Even after receiving his
Miranda rights, Connelly admitted his role in a murder. Id. After Connelly stated he had been
institutionalized for mental illness, the officer once more told him of his right to remain silent.
Id. Connelly refused, and then took the police to the crime scene. Id. at 160-61. The following
morning, Connelly was interviewed by the public defender and stated that he was told to confess
by God. Id. at 161. At a pretrial hearing, a psychiatrist testified that the defendant had chronic
schizophrenia and was in a psychotic state from at least the day prior to his confession. Id. The
psychiatrist further testified that Connelly experienced hallucinations that interfered with his
ability to make free and rational choices. Id. He also testified that the illness did not impair the
defendant's cognitive abilities, so he understood his Miranda rights when he was advised of
them. Id. at 161-62. Although the Colorado Supreme Court found the confession inadmissible
as involuntary, the Supreme Court reversed because of the absence of police coercion. Id. at
170-71.
130. 876 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1989).
131. Raymer, 876 F.2d at 385. Apparently, Raymer felt that his probation officer (ap-
pointed from an unrelated youth offense) had failed to protect his interests. Raymer also sent
threatening mail to a court clerk. Id.
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Initially, a medical board found Raymer incompetent to stand trial.'35
However, a second medical board found Raymer competent. 136 At
trial, Raymer moved the court to suppress his confession as involun-
tary based on his mental illness. 3 7 The court denied this motion and
convicted him.138 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit, relying on Connelly,
held that Raymer's mental illness was not a factor in determining the
voluntariness of his confession. 39 The court acknowledged that a "de-
fendant's mental condition still properly figures into the voluntariness
calculus."' 4 The court further recognized that "[p]olice exploitation
of the mental condition of a suspect, using 'subtle forms of psycho-
logical persuasion,' could render a confession involuntary."'' How-
ever, because Raymer understood his Miranda rights and then subse-
quently incriminated himself, the court held that his confession was
voluntary.' Raymer could have used his psychiatric condition as a
defense regarding the credibility of his confession, but apparently
chose not to do so.
At present, it is difficult, if not impossible, to create a full list of
mental illnesses that are relevant to a confession's credibility. How-
ever, any list should be narrow and reflect significantly diminished
mental processes. One example of specific illness can be seen with
mental retardation, in the general sense.
a. Mental Retardation
Mental retardation's core feature is "significantly sub-average
general intellectual functioning ... that is accompanied by significant
limitations in adoptive functioning in at least two of the following skill
areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal
skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic
skills, work, leisure, health, or safety."' 43 Mental retardation is meas-
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 385-86.
138. Id. at 386. However, the court determined that Raymer suffered from a mental dis-
ease or defect, and committed him to treatment in lieu of imprisonment. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. (citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164-65).
141. Id. at 387 (citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164-65).
142. Id. at 387. The Fifth Circuit cited several facts in upholding the voluntariness of the
confession. First, Raymer was allowed to leave the interrogation. He did, at one point, request
to leave, but voluntarily returned thirty minutes later. Id. The interrogation lasted no more than
forty-two minutes. Id. Moreover, there was an absence of police coercion. Id. Finally, Raymer
admitted during motion testimony that he was familiar with his constitutional rights because of
prior experience with the criminal justice system. Id.
143. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 39 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM IV].
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ured, in part, through the intelligent quotient (I.Q) testing, where a
score of 100 signifies average and 70 or below is classified as signifi-
cantly below average.144 Retardation is generally sub-classified as
mild, moderate, severe, or profound.'45 Mild retardation is the largest
sub-class and involves persons with an I.Q. between 50 and 70.146
Such persons can usually achieve social and vocational skills adequate
for minimum self-support, but require guidance and assistance when
under unusual social or economic stress. 147 Mentally retarded people
are unusually susceptible to the perceived wishes of authority fig-
ures. 48 Even when no direct pressure is exerted on them, they may be
inclined to make false statements out of a desire to please perceived
authority figures.'49 Under this definition, a court would be hard-
pressed to deny a forensic psychiatrist, or psychologist specializing in
mental retardation, as an expert witness where the confession was not
sufficiently detailed to the known facts of the offense.' Indeed, it is
almost undisputed that a mentally retarded suspect is more likely to
confess, and in some cases falsely confess, than a suspect with an aver-
age I.Q s'
b. Drugs and Alcohol
The DSM IV defines alcohol and drug abuse as a subset of the
mental illness "substance abuse."'5 2 In differing degrees, use of alco-
hol and drugs impairs cognitive abilities. Yet there appears to be no
contention in the legal literature that persons under the heavy influ-
ence of either are open to suggestibility during police questioning. In
Pecoraro III, the Seventh Circuit, while acknowledging the existence of




148. Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and
Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CH-I. L. REV. 495, 503-11 (2002) (citing Harter, Mental Age,
I. Q., and Motivational Factors in the Discrimination Learning Set Performance of Normal and Re-
tarded Children, 5 J. EXPERIMENTAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 123, 137-38 (1967)).
149. Id. at 511.
150. Aimee Borromeo, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty, 3 LOy. J. PUB. INT. L.
175, 188 (2002). Evidence shows that mentally retarded defendants more readily confess to
crimes because they are particularly susceptible to coercive police techniques, including friendly
suggestions and intimidation. Id. (citing John Blume & David Bruck, Sentencing the Mentally
Retarded to Death: An Eighth Amendment Analysis, 41 ARK. L. REV. 725, 737 (1988)).
151. Cloud et al., supra note 148, at 503. The authors also note that a generalized desire to
please may predispose a mentally retarded suspect's answers, and mentally retarded people are
often unable to discern when they are in an adversarial situation such as a police interrogation
room. Id. at 512.
152. DSM IV, supra note 143, at 182-83.
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false confessions, held that there is little evidence of drug- or alcohol-
induced false confessions." 3 Instead, the court noted, "[D]rugs or liq-
uor are more likely to induce an involuntary though true confession
than a fabricated one." ' 4 In Pecoraro's initial appeal, a psychologist's
affidavit stated that Pecoraro was "most likely experiencing a blackout
as a result of excessive consumption of alcohol and drugs." '55 Addi-
tionally, the psychologist opined that Pecoraro's cocaine use could
have led to cocaine psychosis."5 6 This is a condition characterized by
poor reality testing, impaired judgment, inability to comprehend and
integrate information, paranoia, and delusions. 7 One aspect of delu-
sions, according to the psychologist, is confabulation.5 8 However, the
court appeared to dismiss this claim.
2. The Social Model: Analysis, Limitations, and Criticisms
Although the concept of false confessions has existed for some
time, studies on causation are relatively new. While popular media
show threats of violence toward suspects as common, the reality of the
confession room is quite different. Indeed, the techniques discussed
above advise investigators to refrain from violence.
There are a few leading scholars in the field of false confession
psychology who also appear in published court decisions. These in-
clude Dr. Lawrence Wrightsman,'59 Dr. Saul M. Kassin, 6 ° Dr. Rich-
153. Pecoraro III, 286 F.3d at 446 (citing State v. Bums, 691 P.2d 297, 302 (Ariz. 1984);
State v. Baker, 606 P.2d 120, 123 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980)).
154. Id. The court also opined that "the expert's 'might have caused' testimony would
have carried little weight with the jury (quite apart from the fact that jurors are unsympathetic to
users of illegal drugs), and the [S]tate would have had no difficulty procuring an expert on the
other side." Id.
155. Pecoraro 1, 677 N.E.2d at 892.
156. Id. at 891.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Dr. Lawrence Wrightsman is a professor of Psychology at the University of Kansas.
His work in the field of false confessions includes, inter alia, CONFESSIONS IN THE
COURTROOM (1993) (with Dr. Saul M. Kassin), Coerced Confessions, Judicial Instructions, and
Mock Juror Verdicts, 11 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 489 (1980) (with Dr. Saul M. Kassin), and
PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1994).
160. Dr. Saul M. Kassin is a professor of Psychology at Williams College. In addition to
CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTROOM (with Dr. Lawrence Wrightsman, see above), he has pub-
lished, inter alia, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, 52 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 221 (1997); Po-
lice Interrogations and Confessions: Communicating Promises and Threats by Pragmatic Implication,
15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 233 (1991) (with Karyln McNall); Coerced Confessions and the Jury: An
ExperimentalTest of the Harmless Error Rule, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27 (1997) (with Holly
Sukel); On the Power of Confession Evidence: An Experimental Test of the Fundamental Difference
Hypothesis, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469 (1997) (with Katherine Neuman).
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ard A. Leo,'61 Dr. Richard A. Ofshe, 6 2 and Dr. Ghisli Gudjonsson. 163
It does not appear in any of their literature that the commonly criti-
cized interrogation methods utilize violence or the threat of violence.
However, Dr. Leo and Dr. Ofshe opine that police-induced false con-
fessions arise when a suspect's resistance to confession is broken down
as a result of poor police practice, overzealousness, criminal miscon-
duct, or misdirected training.'64 Additionally, interrogators sometimes
become so committed to closing a case that they improperly use psy-
chological interrogation techniques to coerce or persuade a suspect
into giving a statement that allows the interrogator to make an ar-
rest.'6 5
It is helpful to note that false confessions tend to fall into three
general types: voluntary, coerced-compliant, and coerced-
internalized.166 A voluntary false confession occurs without any exter-
nal pressure from the police.'67 There are a number of reasons ad-
vanced for this phenomenon, ranging from a need for attention to self-
punishment. 66 It may also be the simple case of an individual at-
161. Dr. Richard A. Leo has published, inter alia, Miranda and the Problem of False Confes-
sions, in THE MIRANDA DEBATE 271-82 (1998); Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 266 (1996); The Ethics of Deceptive Interrogation, 11 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 3
(1992). Leo and Ofshe have introduced another subtype of false confession, which is labeled a
stress-compliant false confession. This is similar to a coerced-compliant confession. However,
Leo and Ofshe cite two major differences between coerced-compliant and stress-compliant con-
fessions. First, coerced-compliant confessions are caused by coercive techniques such as threats
and promises. Second, the suspect may consciously decide to terminate the interrogation to es-
cape the aversive questioning or gain a promised reward. See Richard A. Leo, False Confessions:
Causes, Consequences and Solutions, in WRONGLY CONVICTED: PERSPECTIVES ON FAILED
JUSTICE 43 (2001) (with Dr. Richard A. Ofshe).
162. Dr. Richard A. Ofshe is a social psychologist at the University of California, Berkeley.
These are some of his frequently cited publications: The Consequences of False Confessions: Dep-
rivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998) (with Dr. Richard A. Leo); The Decision to Confess Falsely: Ra-
tional Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 994-96 (1997).
163. Dr. Gudjonsson has written, inter alia, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS,
CONFESSIONS AND TESTIMONY (1992); PERSONS AT RISK DURING INTERVIEWS IN POLICE
CUSTODY: THE IDENTIFICATION OF VULNERABILITIES (RCCJ RESEARCH STUDY No. 12)
(1993).
164. Leo & Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 162, at 440.
165. Id.
166. See WRIGHTSMAN & KASSIN, CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTROOM, supra note 159,
at 84-86; Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 162, at 997.
167. WRIGHTSMAN & KASSIN, CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTROOM, supra note 159, at
86.
168. Id.; see also ROBERT L. SADOFF, M.D., FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND PSYCHIATRISTS 76 (1975). Dr. Sadoff writes that "mostly these
people who confess to 'popular crimes' are guilt-ridden individuals looking for punishment and
are only too eager to 'admit' they 'must be responsible' for the crime, and request imprison-
ment." Id.
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tempting to protect a friend or relative.'69 A coerced-compliant con-
fession, on the other hand, occurs when an individual confesses to
avoid a perceived harm or to gain a reward. 171 It may also be a case of
the interrogator promising freedom after admission. 17' Finally, a co-
erced-internalized false confession occurs where an innocent person"comes to believe he or she may have committed the crime.', 72  Ex-
perts generally point to the physical and emotional condition of the
defendant during the interrogation, as well as to suggestive methods
used during the interrogation.' 73 Some experts liken this latter cate-
gory as related to the implantation of false memories.'74 Other experts
consider modern interrogation techniques as designed to overcome a
suspect's free will and possibly to have the suspect adopt the accusa-
tions presented. 175
Kassin and Wrightsman, among others, utilize this typology to
explain false confessions. 176  As noted in the following section, some
courts have also accepted this typology to clarify testimony. 7   This
Article is more concerned with coerced-compliant and coerced-
internalized confessions than with voluntary false confessions. This is
because voluntary false confessions, such as the case of two hundred
people confessing to the kidnapping of the Lindberg baby, are based
in such phenomena as "a morbid desire for notoriety.' '1 78
169. WRIGHTSMAN & KASSIN, CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTROOM, supra note 159, at
88-89.
170. Id.; see also Ofshe & Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely, supra note 162, at 994-96.
171. WRIGHTSMAN & KASSIN, CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTROOM, supra note 159, at
88-89.




176. See, e.g., State v. Free, 798 A.2d 83 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2002). However, it should
be noted that Leo and Ofshe have altered and expanded this list to the following categories: vol-
untary false confessions, stress-compliant false confessions, compliant false confessions, coerced-
persuaded false confessions, and noncoerced-persuaded false confessions.
177. Id. at 90. Here, the Free court analyzes jurisdictions accepting false confession psy-
chology evidence, and compares different cases to the New Jersey Rules of Evidence.
178. WRIGHTSMAN & KASSIN, CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTROOM, supra note 159, at
86. Wrightsman and Kassin also suggest motives such as the unconscious need to expiate guilt
over previous transgressions via self-punishment, the desire to aid and protect the real criminal,
and persons who suffer from mental illness. Id. It is interesting that Wrightsman and Kassin
separate mental illness from other categories. This separation appears to give credence to an ac-
ceptance of a biological basis for false confessions by some adherents of the social model of false
confessions.
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a. Coerced- Compliant Confession
Coerced-compliant confessions are rooted "in an overt, public
acquiescence to a social influence attempt in order to achieve some
immediate instrumental gain."' 79  In their work Confessions in the
Courtroom, Wrightsman and Kassin use prisoner of war studies from
the Korean War as examples of coerced-compliant confessions. t0 Co-
erced-compliant confessions are sometimes caused by the fatigue,
pressures, and suggestiveness of the interrogation process.' 8 ' There
are theories advanced as to why coerced-compliant confessions occur.
For example, some psychologists view interrogation as a quasi-
hypnotic state where police interrogation "can produce a trance-like
state of heightened suggestibility."'82
Dr. Gudjonsson developed the concept of interrogative suggesti-
bility to explain individualized responses to police questioning.'83 In
Gudjonsson's view, interrogative suggestibility is defined as "the ex-
tent to which within a closed social interaction, people come to accept
messages communicated during formal questioning as the result of
their subsequent behavioral response."' 84  Gudjonsson suggests five
interrelated components as part of the interrogative suggestibility the-
ory:
(1) a closed social interaction between the interrogator and the
interviewee;
(2) a questioning procedure that involves two or more partici-
pants;
(3) a suggestive stimulus;
(4) acceptance of the suggestive stimulus; and
179. Id. at 88.
180. Id. at 89. Wrightsman and Kassin write:
Relevant to the forced-compliant category are most of the cases of "brainwashing" of
American prisoners of war. Almost 40 years ago, during the Korean War, Americans
learned from reports by the North Koreans that a number of captured American mili-
tary men had confessed to a number of treasonable acts and expressions of disloyalty
to the United States. The news created a national scandal; commentators asked if
American young men were "lacking in the moral character necessary to take a difficult
and possibly dangerous stand on the basis of their principles."
Id.
181. Id. at 92.
182. Id. at 93.
183. Id. at 95.
184. Id.
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(5) a behavioral response to indicate whether or not the sugges-
tion is accepted.'
According to Gudjonsson, characteristics of the interviewee also
affect the process of the interrogation. For persons likely to employ"avoidance coping," there may be greater possibility of suggestibil-
ity."' Gudjonsson claims that persons with poor memory and low in-
telligence are more generally suggestible.1 7  Additionally, low self-
esteem, lack of assertiveness, and anxiety are factors leading to sug-
gestibility."' In contrast, persons who are normally suspicious and
distrusting of law enforcement or other semblances of authority are
less likely to be suggestible. 9 Gudjonsson created a suggestibility
scale to assess a subject's responses to leading questions and negative
feedback. 9 ° To date, this scale remains largely unused in America's
courts.' 9 ' Wrightsman and Kassin appear to believe that persons with
anxiety are most likely to fall victim to suggestibility.'92
An additional element in a coerced-compliant confession appears
to be compliance.'93 Gudjonsson differentiated between compliance




188. Id. at 96.
189. Id.
190. Id. The scale uses a narrative paragraph describing a fictitious mugging, which is read
to the subjects. The subjects are then asked to recall all they can about the story. After a delay
of about fifty minutes, a subject is asked twenty specific questions, fifteen of which are subtly
misleading. After answering these, the person is informed that he or she has made a number of
mistakes (even if no errors have been made), and thus it is necessary to ask each of the questions
once more. The person is instructed to try to be more accurate than before. Any change in an-
swers from the previous trial is labeled a "shift"; the extent to which people give in to the mis-
leading questions is scored as a "yield." "Yields" and "shifts" are added together to make up a
"total suggestibility" score. The measure of interrogative suggestibility appears to be independ-
ent of hypnotizability.
191. See, e.g., Maj. James Agar, The Admissibility of False Confession Expert Testimony,
1999-AUG ARMY LAW. 26, 27-28 (1999). Agar writes that because Gudjonsson's research was
largely centered on British police interrogations, his work is not applicable in United States
courtrooms. British law does not have a Miranda equivalent, the exclusionary rule is virtually
nonexistent, and police are not permitted to engage in trickery or deceit such as in the United
States. Id. For an explanation of the scale, see, e.g., Gudjonsson, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
INTERROGATIONS, CONFESSIONS, AND TESTIMONY, supra note 163, at 55.
192. WRIGHTSMAN & KASSIN, CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTROOM, supra note 159, at
96. In 1990, Gudjonsson conducted a study using 100 alleged false confessors, with 104 other
criminal defendants charged with similar offenses (all of whom had been evaluated by psycholo-
gists). The mean ages for the two groups were 29 and 34 respectively. The average I.Q. of the
alleged false confessors was 80.0, significantly less than the average of 91.4 for the comparison
group. The false confessors scored significantly higher on measures of suggestibility, compli-
ance, and acquiescence.
193. Id.
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acceptance.194 Compliance denotes a conscious decision to carry out
the behavior, whether or not he or she has agreed to do it privately.195
However, variables found in suggestibility, such as an eagerness to
please and avoidance of controversy, are common to both suggestibil-
ity and compliance.
b. Coerced-Internalized Confessions
As noted above, adherents of the social model believe a coerced-
internalized confession occurs when the suspect, through fatigue, pres-
sures, and suggestiveness, actually comes to believe that he or she
committed the offense.' Many of the elements discussed regarding
coerced-compliant confessions apply to coerced-internalized confes-
sions. 197 However, there is an additional element where the confessor
reaches a point where he fully believes in his own guilt. 9 ' Should this
transpire, a memory alteration effectively occurs.
Most of the available human behavioral studies directed at find-
ing the causes of false confessions are essentially extrapolative tests
conducted outside of the interrogation room. For instance, Wrights-
man and Kassin write of a seemingly valid experiment where subjects
performed a task that required them to cross out a sample of words
from a master list.199 Then, establishing two lights as a discriminative
stimuli for truth and falsity, subjects were asked general questions
about themselves and were instructed to answer truthfully when the
room was illuminated with a green light and to lie in the presence of
an amber light.2"' In the next phase of the procedure, the experi-
menter announced several words taken from the initial task.2" 1 After
some words he instructed the subjects to lie, and after other words to
tell the truth, about whether they previously crossed the word out-
again in the presence of a green or amber light.2"2 In the final step of
the procedure, subjects were asked, for each word, to recall whether
they actually had or had not crossed the word out.2"3 The results indi-
cated that false statements made in the presence of the "truth" light
produced more errors in the recall of actual performance than either
194. Id. at 97.
195. Id.
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false statements made in the presence of the "lie" light or false state-
ments made with no light at all.2°4 Wrightsman and Kassin argue that
such anecdotal reports suggest the existence of internalized false con-
fessions, but urge caution in evaluating experiments such as the one
above.205
Ofshe and Leo appear to label some internalized confessions as
"noncoerced persuaded false confessions. 2 6 A noncoerced persuaded
false confession is not elicited in response to coercive interrogation
techniques alone.2 °7 It is elicited in response to the influence tactics
and techniques of modern, psychologically sophisticated accusatorial
interrogation, and is given by a suspect who has temporarily come to
believe that it is more likely than not that he committed the offense,
despite having no memory of doing so.208 As in the case of coerced-
compliant confessions, noncoerced persuaded false confessions are de-
livered in the "grammar of confabulation. ' 29  Once the persuaded
false confessor is removed from the influences and pressures of the in-
terrogation environment, the person comes to realize that he or she
could not have possibly committed the crime and typically recants his
or her confession.210
There have been several ideas advanced to combat the potential
use of false confessions in the courtroom. In particular, Leo and Of-
she advocate videotaping interrogations,2 11 while also calling for more
widespread admissibility of expert witnesses. Others have sought to
prohibit the use of confessions obtained in coercive interrogations al-
together.
i. Mandatory Videotaping of Interrogation: Argument For and Against
Drs. Leo and Ofshe's argument for the mandatory videotaping of
confessions utilizes Alaska and Minnesota case law as examples. At
present, these states require videotaping interrogations when done at
police stations. For example, in Stephan v. State,2 12 the Alaska Su-
preme Court noted that the state constitution conferred a right of"electronic recording" on defendants questioned in a custodial inter-
204. Id.
205. Id. at 98-99.






211. Leo & Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 162, at 495.
212. 711 P.2d 1156 (Alaska 1985).
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rogation. 213 The court further determined that federal due process
does not require interrogations to be recorded.214 Likewise, in State v.
Page,21 5 the Alaska high court recognized the state's constitutional
electronic recording requirement was unique to that state.26
In Minnesota, the videotape requirement is rooted in case law,
but a violation of the requirement does not equate to automatic sup-
pression. For instance, in State v. Scales"7 the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that "the parameters of the exclusionary rule applied to
evidence of statements obtained in violation of these [electronic re-
cording] requirements must be decided on a case-by-case basis. "211
The Minnesota court developed a "substantial violation" test to de-
termine whether confession evidence must be suppressed, which is es-
sentially rooted in a "bad faith" test of police action.21 9 To date, no re-
cording requirement is recognized either in federal law or in the law of
the other forty-eight states.22 °
Leo argues that videotaping confessions is valid for three reasons.
First, it creates a record of the interrogation that can be subsequently
reviewed.221 Hence, a videotaped confession may reduce the "all-too-
common swearing contest" in court between police witnesses and
criminal defendants.222 While this may be a factor, courts tend to be-
lieve issues of credibility are best determined by lay testimony and the
trier of fact is fully capable of determining credibility. 223 It may also
lessen the chance the defendant will testify. As a result, the argument
for a mandatory videotaping requirement remains an argument and
not a legal application.
A second reason for videotaping confessions is that it reduces the
likelihood of officer abuse during the interrogation.224 However, ob-
served "one-way" confessions, in which several police officers observe
213. Id. at 1159.
214. Id.
215. 932 P.2d 1297 (Alaska 1997).
216. Id. at 1301-03.
217. 518 N.W.2d 587 (Minn. 1994).
218. Id. at 592.
219. Id.
220. See, e.g., United States v. Dumas, 207 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2000); Henry v. Page, 223
F.3d 477 (7th Cir. 2000).
221. Leo & Ofshe, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences and Solutions, supra note 161, at
49.
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d. 1251, 1267 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that
generally "expert testimony which does nothing but vouch for the credibility of another witness
encroaches upon the jury's vital and exclusive function to make credibility determinations, and
therefore does not 'assist the trier of fact' as required by [Federal Rule of Evidence] 702").
224. Leo & Ofshe, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences and Solutions, supra note 161, at
2003]
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the interrogation unbeknownst to the suspect, will partially fulfill that
same goal.
Finally, videotaping provides law enforcement officials with the
ability to monitor the quality of the interrogation process.22 Leo
opines that police, prosecutors, judges, and defense counsel will thus
be more able to detect false confessions.226 While this is true, it is also
true that greater investigative efforts to corroborate confessions
through the acquisition of evidence will fulfill the same goal. All too
often, the culture of law enforcement "rests" a case investigation upon
the attainment of a confession. As noted above, the corroboration rule
exists to prevent a false confession alone from resulting in a convic-
tion.
There are other problems with Dr. Leo's argument for videotap-
ing confessions. For one thing, a videotape requirement will increase
the chances of an ineffective interrogation. With human nature being
what it is, people are more willing to talk when the discussion is per-
ceived as a one-on-one, or even two-on-one conversation. The impo-
sition of electronic recording equipment in the interrogation room, or
even the mere knowledge of electronic recording, will likely reduce the
chances of an effective discussion.
ii. Arguments For and Against Expert Witness Admissibility
Dr. Leo also argues for the increased admissibility of expert wit-
227 taness testimony. He states that
expert witness testimony in disputed confession cases is neces-
sary because the traditional procedures of the adversarial system
(such as opening and closing arguments, cross-examination of
witnesses, cautionary instructions to juries, and so on) are not
sufficient to safeguard innocent individuals against the likeli-
hood of wrongful conviction based on unreliable confession evi-
dence.228
He also opines that such expert witness testimony may reduce the
number of police-induced false confessions. Primarily, Dr. Leo views
the role of an expert as an educational one. That is, the expert's focus
should be on assisting the trier of fact in understanding general find-
ings and social-scientific research regarding interrogation processes,
and how such processes can lead to false confessions.229




229. Id. at 51. Dr. Leo proffers the following view:
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Of course, the problem with more widespread admissibility of
expert evidence is its potential for misuse, which unfortunately occurs
all too often in American courts today.23° As seen throughout this Ar-
ticle, the admission of expert evidence is guided by rules of reliability.
Even with the more liberal admissibility standard under Daubert, it
can hardly be argued that false confession psychology is accepted asscientifically reliable. 231' At best, it may be considered as specialized
but unreliable knowledge.
As argued below, greater admissibility will lead to two unwanted
effects. The first deals with a "battle of the experts. 2 32  Courts are
loathe to permit dueling expert witnesses in criminal cases. However,
this battle will happen precisely because of the dual problem of unreli-
ability and the danger of something akin to "junk science." The sec-
ond issue is that greater admissibility of false confession psychological
evidence detracts from the central issue in the case, which is the quan-
tity and quality of the prosecution's evidence. After all, it is the
prosecution who bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
While it is clear that false confessions do occur, and sometimes
occur because of police misconduct, evidence of the interrogation
environment is "fair game." Such evidence can come in the form of a
defendant's testimony, or by way of cross-examination of other wit-
nesses. This evidence goes to the weight and credibility of the confes-
sion. In tandem with the confession corroboration rule, discussed
briefly above, it may be the case that the only needed feature is an ad-
ditional instruction regarding the weight the trier of fact is to accord a
confession based on other evidence. Moreover, opening the courts to
false confession psychology will also likely open the courts to rebuttal
Social science experts can aid the jury by (1) discussing the scientific research litera-
ture documenting the phenomenon of police-induced false confessions (thereby refut-
ing the myth of psychological interrogation), (2) explaining how and why particular
interrogation methods and strategies can cause the innocent to confess, (3) identifying
the conditions that increase the risk of false confession, and (4) explaining the gener-
ally accepted principles of post-admission narrative analysis. By educating the jury
about the existence, psychology, causes, and indicia of police-induced false confession,
social science expert witness testimony at trial should reduce the number of confes-
sion-based wrongful convictions.
Id.
230. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM 2 (1992).
231. See, e.g., Paul Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confession and Lost Confes-
sions-And From Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 507 (1998). Cassell critiques Leo
and Ofshe's methodology in stating that "rather than haphazardly collecting individual cases, a
more logical way to assess the frequency question is to take a random sample of cases and evalu-
ate the proportion of false confessions in it .... There are reasonable ways to approach this
task." Id.
232. See, e.g., Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1013 (7th Cir. 1990).
2003]
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evidence rooted in the same field. That is, should the defense be per-
mitted to present false confession psychology, it appears likely, as seen
from the analysis below, that courts will permit profile evidence in re-
buttal.
iii. Confession Corroboration Redux
Somewhat glossed over in the social model of false confessions is
the need for corroboration, which is rooted in common law. Corrobo-
ration is a pivotal, but not perfect, safeguard against false confessions.
Corroboration is within the understanding of the trier of fact.233 Cer-
tainly, a defense lawyer would be remiss in failing to argue either that
his client's confession was not supported by the other evidence, or that
the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence of a real confes-
sion.
iv. Other Criticisms of the Social Model
One criticism of the social model is its inability to explain why
some persons fail to assert their right to silence and their right to legal
counsel. 34 To date, there has been no satisfactory explanation as to
why a person, who is at liberty at any time to deny investigators an in-
terrogation, will fail to do so.23 A person may even tell the interroga-
233. See, e.g., Ayling, supra note 39, at 1140.
234. See, e.g., Amanda L. Prebble, Note, Manipulated by Miranda: A Critical Analysis of
Bright Lines and Voluntary Confession Under United States v. Dickerson, 68 U. GIN. L. REV. 555,
579 (2000). Prebble writes that there appear to be several arguments to explain Miranda's mar-
ginal effect on confessions. These arguments include police violation of the rule, minimizing the
Miranda notification, and poor defense counsel advice. Additionally, some suspects confess out
of remorse. Id.
One argument that is absent from Prebble's article, as well as much of the psychology re-
search in false confessions, is that suspects go into the confession room in an attempt to create a
scenario of innocence, in effect placing suspicion elsewhere. However, trained police interroga-
tors can sometimes spot and deflect these attempts. Moreover, suspects who create fictitious ali-
bis are likely to present contradictions in their version of events.
235. See Paul Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L.
REV. 387 (1996). According to Cassell, Miranda resulted in a 16% reduction in the confession
rate, and it is responsible for lost convictions in 3.8% of all serious criminal cases. As a result, the
government fails to obtain convictions in approximately 28,000 violent crime and 79,000 prop-
erty crime cases each year, and is forced to settle for plea bargains on terms more favorable to
criminal defendants in a similar number of cases. Id. at 440. Some researchers attributed this
largely unexpected finding to the manner in which detectives delivered the Miranda warnings,
while others attributed it to the failure of suspects to understand the meaning or significance of
their Miranda rights. Id. (citing Michael Wald et al., Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of
Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519 (1967)).
Some authorities disagree with Cassell's analysis. Not surprisingly, Dr. Richard A. Leo criti-
cizes Cassell's "selectivity in citing data," methodology, and conclusions. Richard A Leo,
Miranda's Irrelevance: Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99
MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1007-09 (2001); see also Welsh S. White, What Is An Involuntary Confes-
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tor, after learning of his or her status as a suspect, a statement to the
effect of, "Look, I am innocent, but I do not want to talk with you be-
fore speaking with an attorney." Additionally, this criticism can be
seen as part of a greater concern regarding the social model's method-
ologies, which are largely based on anecdotal evidence. For instance,
Professor Paul Cassell, who is perhaps the foremost critic of contem-
porary false confession psychology, argues that there has never been a
widesweeping empirical study to justify the changes advanced by Dr.
Leo and Dr. Ofshe.2 36 Instead, he argues that the studies of Ofshe and
Leo are based on small numbers in case studies.2 37 Additionally, Dr.
Kassin writes that it is impossible to determine, or even estimate, the
frequency with which people confess to crimes they did not commit.238
Likewise, although Dr Leo and Dr. Ofshe argue false confessions are
frequent, no one knows precisely how frequently false confessions lead
to wrongful convictions.2 39 One of the major problems with the Leo-
Ofshe studies is that they do not categorize "false confessions" into
mental illness types. Instead, they appear to rely on selected case
studies of false confessions.
sion Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001, 2031 n.189 (1998) (stating that "even if Cassell's calcula-
tions deserved to be taken seriously, his conclusions would be subject to the criticism "garbage
in, garbage out"); Peter Arenella, Miranda Stories, 20 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 375, 380 (1997)
("Cassell has clearly exaggerated the extent to which the Miranda regime has hampered law en-
forcement.").
236. Paul Cassell, Criminal Law: Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost
Confessions And from Miranda, supra note 231, at 501. Cassell writes:
Given this need for quantification, it is curious that the false confessions literature
never provides even a ballpark estimate of the frequency of false confessions. Instead,
the articles in the area, including most prominently Leo and Ofshe's foregoing work,
reason solely from anecdotal examples. They present notorious illustrations of false
confessions to establish that the problem exists. They then remind the reader that"no one can authoritatively estimate the rate of police induced false confessions" or
that an assessment of the frequency of false confessions "is difficult to make accu-
rately." Nonetheless, the articles swiftly assert, false confessions "threaten the quality
of criminal justice in America" and are "likely... in a small but significant number of
cases." The articles then conclude by proposing restrictions on police interrogation or




238. WRIGHTSMAN & KASSIN, CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTROOM, supra note 159, at
85.
239. Leo & Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions, supra note 162, at 431. In their
article, Leo and Ofshe studied sixty cases of police-induced false confessions in the post Miranda
era. Id, at 433. In the cases analyzed, scant commentary is provided as to psychiatric conditions,
if any, suffered by the individuals. For instance, regarding one Douglas Wamey, they write,
"Warney, a mentally handicapped man who was suffering from AIDS-related dementia at the
time of his interrogation." Id. at 465. There is no analysis as to how this dementia may have
given rise to suggestibility.
Seattle University Law Review
Two final criticisms must be mentioned here, as they are ana-
lyzed throughout this Article. The first involves rebuttal. While false
confession psychology adherents argue for greater expert admissibility,
it appears little thought has been given to the scope of prosecution re-
buttal. It may, and perhaps should, very likely be the case that the
prosecution is entitled to rebut false confession psychology evidence
with psychology-based profile evidence. Indeed, profile evidence is
given greater reliability credence than psychology-based false confes-
sion evidence.240 Finally, there is the risk that social model-based false
confession testimony will become a "truth-meter," invading the prov-
ince of the jury. While several cases discussed below deal with this is-
sue, it is important to note that truth-seeking is primarily within the
sole province of the jury.
III. BASIC RULES FOR THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
The first widely adopted application of limitations regarding the
use of expert witnesses was established in Frye v. United States.24' In
Frye, the use of scientific and other expert testimony was limited in
that, to be admissible, the testimony had to be based on scientific
principles that were "generally accepted" in the applicable scientific
community.242 For roughly seventy years this standard was main-
tained in federal and state courts.243 It tended to reflect the anticipated
use of "hard science" and engineering rather than social science.244
However, between 1923 and 1993, significant advances were achieved
throughout most scientific and social science fields, somewhat blurring
240. See, e.g., Dennis P. Saccuzzo, Still Crazy After All These Years: California's Persistent
Use of the MMPI as Character Evidence in Criminal Cases, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 379 (1999) (noting
that while profile evidence has well-founded criticisms, courts routinely admit profile test evi-
dence).
241. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Frye, the D.C. Circuit Court considered the use of
the "systolic blood pressure deception test" (polygraph evidence) as a case of first impression.
The court held that "the polygraph had not yet gained such standing and scientific recognition
among physiological and psychological authorities." Id. at 1014. See also PAUL GIANELLI &
EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 11 (3d ed. 1999).
242. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. The court specifically held:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental
and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the
evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while the courts will go a
long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific
principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be suffi-
ciently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.
Id.
243. GIANELLI & IMWINKELREID, supra note 241, at 11.
244. See, e.g., State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80 (Iowa 1980); GIANELLI & IMWINKELREID,
supra note 241, at 28.
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the distinction between hard science and other fields.24 This compli-
cated Frye's restrictive approach, which envisioned acceptance by a
specific field,246 given that much of the science employed in expert tes-
timony stretches over several fields. 247 In particular, the fields of psy-
chology and psychiatry, where statistics and models encompass a
prominent role, presented challenges for admissibility under the Frye
standard.248 Moreover, the increased use of psychologists and psy-
chiatrists by various federal and state law enforcement and penology
assessments showed the need for greater testimonial admissibility.249
The increased use of expert testimony in civil cases, ranging from
products liability to psychological harm, showed the Frye admissibility
standard could not be fairly applied to every issue.250 Nonetheless, a
number of states still utilize varying standards based on Frye.251
In the 1993 case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,252
the Supreme Court set a new threshold for admissibility. In its deci-
sion, the Court rejected Frye's seventy- year- old "general acceptance"
requirement for admitting scientific evidence. Instead, the Court held
that Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 702 superseded Frye.253 Addi-
245. GIANELLI & IMWINKELREID, supra note 241, at 28.
246. Id.
247. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978); see also Carl-
ton Bailey, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence in Arkansas: Does Frye Matter?, 52 ARK.
L. REV. 671, 683 (1999).
248. Bailey, supra note 247, at 683.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. GIANELLI & IMWINKELREID, supra note 241, at 84-87. The jurisdictions include:
Alabama (Ex parte Turner, 733 So. 2d 497 (Ala. 1998)); Arizona (State v. Tankersly, 956 P.2d
486, 491 (Ariz. 1998)); California (People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 323 (Cal. 1994)); Colorado
(Lindey v. People, 892 P.2d 281, 288 (Colo. 1995)); Florida (Murray v. State, 692 So. 2d 157,
164 (Fla. 1997)); Illinois (People v. Miller, 670 N.E.2d 721, 731 (Ill. 1996)); Kansas (State v.
Colbert, 896 P.2d 1089, 1097 (Kan. 1995)); Maryland (Burral v. State, 724 A.2d 65, 80 (Md.
1999)); Michigan (People v. Lee, 537 N.W.2d 233,249 n.17 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995)), Mississippi
(Young v. City of Brookhaven, 693 So. 2d 1355, 1360-61 (Miss. 1997)); Missouri (State v.
Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 327 (Mo. 1996)); Nebraska (State v. Freeman, 571 N.W.2d 276, 289
(Neb. 1997)); New Jersey (State v. Harvey, 699 A.2d 596, 621 (N.J. 1997)); New York (People v.
Wernick, 674 N.E.2d 322 (N.Y.1996)); Pennsylvania (Commonwealth v. Blasioli, 713 A.2d
1117, 1119 (Pa. 1998)); and Washington (State v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1304, 1315 (Wash. 1996)
(en banc)).
252. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
253. FED. R. EVID. 702 reads as follows:
Testimony by Experts: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will as-
sist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a wit-
ness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based
upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the
facts of the case.
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tionally, the Court found that even though the common law may serve
as an aid to FRE 702's application, the strict Frye standards are at
odds with the rule's liberal thrust and general approach of relaxing the
traditional barriers to opinion testimony.254 In essence, the Court
changed the legal and substantive basis for using scientific evidence as
well as the procedural approach lawyers and judges will have to take in
dealing with such evidence. The Court further held that within the
language of FRE 702, trial judges can adequately perform the task of
ensuring that an expert's testimony rests on reliable grounds, is rele-
vant to the task at hand, and will assist the trier of fact.25" As a result,
the trial judge now is a "gatekeeper" who determines whether the of-
fered theory or application can assist in resolving a legal dispute. Fi-
nally, the Daubert Court indicated four factors that can be considered
in determining whether expert testimony of this type should be con-
sidered scientifically valid for admissibility under FRE 702 .2 6 These
four factors are (1) whether the theory or technique can be and has
been tested; (2) whether the technique has been subject to peer review
and publication; (3) the technique's known or potential rate of error;
and (4) the level of the theory or technique's acceptance within the
relevant discipline.5 7
It must be noted that Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703, and 704 govern the admissibility of
expert evidence, but, in federal courts, do so within the confines of Daubert. FED. R. EvID. 703
provides:
Bases of Opinion Testimony by Experts: The facts or data in the particular case upon
which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made
known to the expert at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the
facts or data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference
to be admitted. Facts or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to
the jury by the proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that
their probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially
outweighs their prejudicial effect.
FED. R. EVID. 704 reads:
Opinion on Ultimate Issue:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an opinion or in-
ference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue
to be decided by the trier of fact.
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a de-
fendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defen-
dant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the
crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of
fact alone.
254. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596-97.
255. Id. at 592-93.
256. Id. at 593-94.
257. Id. As a helpful aid, these factors were further summarized by the Sixth Circuit in
United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 542 (6th Cir. 1993) as (1) whether the theory or technique
can, or has been tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer review
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In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,2s8 the Court applied its Daubert
rationale to nonscientific, technical, and other specialized knowl-
edge. 29  Essentially, Kumho extends the admissibility threshold of
Daubert to a variety of quasi-scientific and nonscientific fields.26° In
Kumho Tire, the Court declared that judges serve as gatekeepers for all
expert testimony, not just scientific evidence.26' This ended the dis-
tinction between "scientific" and "nonscientific" expert testimony un-
der FRE 702.262 The Court stated that trial judges "may" use the
Daubert factors in arriving at a decision to find expert testimony reli-
able.263  The Court emphasized, however, that the Daubert factors
were not a checklist or a test.264
Social science is but one field subject to a Daubert analysis, and it
must be noted that the proponent of the expert testimony bears the
burden of persuading the court that such testimony covers all four fac-
tors. As previously noted, false confession evidence falls into two gen-
eral categories, the medical model and social model. The study of in-
terrogation conditions and its correlation to false confessions is rooted
in social science. Psychiatric conditions leading to a character for mal-
leability tend to be more a hybrid of social and hard science, with an
emphasis on the latter.
It should be noted that while false confession expert evidence is
considered in light of evidentiary rules, it appears that the jurisdic-
tional distinction between Frye and Daubert has only a minimal impact
on the question of admissibility. It may be the case that other issues
outweigh the Daubert and Frye distinction. It may also be the case
and publication; (3) the known or potential rate or error in using a particular scientific technique
and the standards controlling the technique's operation; and (4) whether the theory or technique
has been generally accepted in the particular scientific field.
258. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
259. Id. at 141-42. In Kumho Tire, the Court stated as follows:
We conclude that Daubert's general holding setting forth the trial judge's general
"gate-keeping" obligation applies not only to testimony based on scientific knowl-
edge, but also to testimony based on "technical" and "other specialized knowledge."
See FED. R. EvID. 702. We also conclude that a trial court may consider one or more
specific factors that Daubert mentioned when doing so will help determine that testi-
mony's reliability. But, as the Court states in Daubert, the test of reliability is "flexi-
ble" and Daubert's list of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to
all experts or in every case. Rather, the law grants a district court the same broad lati-
tude when it determines how to determine reliability as it enjoys in respect to its ulti-
mate reliability determination.
Id.
260. Edgar Garcia-Rill & Erica Beecher-Monas, Gatekeeping Stress: The Science and Admis-
sibility of Post-Traumatic Stress Distorder, 24 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 9, 29 (2001).
261. Agar, supra note 191, at 34 (1999).
262. Id.
263. Id. (citing Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 174).
264. Agar, supra note 191, at 34 (citing Kumho Tire, 526 U.S. at 147).
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that courts admit or suppress false confession expert evidence based
on a wide or narrow reading of each of these opinions.
IV. FALSE CONFESSION TESTIMONY: THE STATE OF COURTS
TODAY
Federal and state courts have responded to the use of expert tes-
timony in four ways that can be categorized. Some courts have pro-
hibited the use of false confession expert evidence altogether. These
courts generally fall into four categories. The first category involves
courts holding that such evidence invades the province of the trier of
fact.26 The second category involves courts holding that proffered
false confession testimony, particularly in the social model, fails to
meet an expert admissibility threshold.266 As a third category, some
courts have permitted the use of false confession expert evidence but
only to the point of describing general interrogation conditions gener-
ally thought to produce false confessions." 7 A fourth category in-
volves court decisions permitting psychiatrists, and sometimes psy-
chologists, to testify as to a defendant's mental illness that is relevant
to accepting and adopting information provided to him during the in-
terrogation.26 Although this phenomenon is called suggestibility, for
purposes of this Article it will be referred to as a "character of malle-
ability." Only in a few published cases do the courts either establish a
background qualification threshold for the testifying expert, or estab-
265. E.g., State v. Cobb, 43 P.2d 855 (Kan. Ct. App. 2002). In Cobb, the Kansas Court of
Appeals, reviewing the prosecution's cross-appeal, held Dr. Leo's testimony regarding false con-
fessions violated the province of the jury. At trial, Dr. Leo had been permitted to testify that the
"Reid technique" was inherently coercive. Specifically, Leo was concerned with the use of em-
bellishment and the police confronting Cobb with what they characterized as irrefutable evidence
of his guilt. Id. at 861. Similarly, in State v. Davis, a Missouri court held that Dr. Leo's testi-
mony regarding interrogation techniques violated the province of the jury. 32 S.W.3d 603 (Mo.
App. E.D. 2000). Additionally, the court held cross-examination of police witnesses, as well as
the defendant's right to testify, permits an adequate means for bringing forth the interrogation
conditions before the jury. Id. at 609.
A Maine court also addressed the instant issue in State v. Tellier, 526 A.2d 941 (Me. 1987).
In Tellier, the defendant attempted to introduce evidence from Dr. Steven Penrod, a psychologist
and professor specializing in false confessions, that Tellier's interrogation and subsequent confes-
sion to murder were consistent with several of the factors found in false confessions. Further-
more, the defense proffered, Dr. Penrod would state no specific opinion as to whether Tellier's
statements were true or false, but rather that false confessions in general occur under certain
known circumstances. The trial court suppressed this testimony, and its decision was upheld by
the state supreme court. Id.
266. E.g., People v. Rivera, 777 N.E.2d 360 (Il1. App. Ct. 2001) (with little comment, up-
holding trial judge's determination that Dr. Ofshe's testimony would not meet the general accep-
tance test under Frye).
267. E.g., Callis v. State, 684 N.E. 223 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997).
268. E.g., United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Corey, 625
F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1980); State v. Bums, 691 P.2d 297 (Ariz. 1984).
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lish limits as to the prosecution's scope of rebuttal.269 In most cases,
although a single issue leads to acceptance or denial of psychologist or
psychiatrist testimony, the decisions revolve around two or more of
the issues discussed in this paragraph. 27" As the reader will note, the"medical model" remains the basis for acceptance in several of these
cases. 2
7'
A. Evidence Invading the Truth-Seeking Province of the Trier of Fact:
The Tenth Circuit and Minnesota Examples
Generally, witnesses are not permitted to testify as to the reliabil-
ity of confessions, or, for that matter, the reliability of statements
made by other witnesses.272 Such testimony is in itself unreliable and
invades the truth-seeking province of the trier of fact. 273  However,
there are, as noted above, instances where expert testimony is admissi-
ble for a specific issue that a lay witness could not testify to. Regard-
ing false confession testimony, some jurisdictions find that any psy-
chology-based expert evidence regarding interrogation conditions is
either irrelevant or invasive of the truth-seeking province of the trier of
fact. Two examples of this view are analyzed below.
1. United States v. Adams
In United States v. Adams, the Tenth Circuit was confronted, in
part, with a trial court's decision to prohibit a psychologist from testi-
fying as to the defendant's character for malleability.274 Initially, the
defendant, a convicted felon, confessed to the Wichita police that he
illegally possessed a firearm.275 While the defense did not refer the
court to coercive aspects of the interrogation, defense counsel did ar-
gue that Adams possessed a character trait that raised doubts as to the
confession's credibility. Specifically, the defense claimed Adams suf-
fered from a "neurocognitive impairment and dependent personality
269. United States v. Stitt, 250 F.3d 878, 897-98 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hall, 165
F.3d 1095, 1117 (7th Cir. 1999).
270. For example, in United States v. Adams, 271 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2001), the court
relied on concerns about the lack of a well-defined psychiatric disorder, but ultimately rested its
decision on the premise that the particular testimony would invade the province of the trier of
fact. Id. at 284.
271. Shay, 57 F.3d at 126; People v. Parks, 579 P.2d 76 (Colo. 1978).
272. See, e.g., Flynn v. State, 847 P.2d 1073 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993).
273. See, e.g., Hutton v. State, 663 A.2d 1289 (1993) (Rodowski, J., concurring).
274. 271 F.3d 1236, 1240-42 (10th Cir. 2001). Part of the trial court's decision to suppress
expert testimony was a result of the defense's late disclosure of the evidence to the prosecution.
Id. While this issue is an important discovery matter, it is not relevant to this Article.
275. Adams, 271 F.3d at 1240. Adams was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Id.
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disorder." 276 Adams offered this evidence through the testimony of a
psychologist who had reviewed Adams' background and held sessions
with him. 277 The defense's theory rested on the premise that Adams'
condition increased the likelihood that he would lie to please the po-
lice.278
Adams argued both at trial and on appeal that suppression of the
psychologist's testimony violated the basic tenets of Crane v. Ken-
tucky.279 Both the trial court and appellate court found that the credi-
bility of witnesses, including the defendant, was not an appropriate
subject for expert testimony.2"' The Tenth Circuit did suggest that a
defined psychiatric disorder might open the door to expert testimony
regarding the credibility of the confession.281  It is important to note
that Adams did not raise a defined psychiatric disorder as part of his
defense. However, the Tenth Circuit rested its decision on the well-
settled premise that the significance of explanations for why a person
would confess is something that "a jury is capable of resolving without
expert testimony."282
2. Minnesota
In Bixler v. State,283 the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed a
lower court's decision to permit false confession evidence. Defendant
Bixler was a mildly retarded male who was initially suspected of sexu-
ally abusing his child. 284 The police interrogated Bixler the day after
the initial complaint was filed.28 ' Before questioning Bixler, the police
interviewed his wife regarding his condition and personal habits.286
Following this interview, the police interrogated Bixler after reading
him his Miranda rights. According to police testimony, Bixler under-
276. Id. at 1244.
277. Id.
278. Id. However, Adams initially told the police he lied to protect his girlfriend. Id.
279. Id. at 1244; see supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text for a review of the Crane
facts and holding.
280. Id. at 1245.
281. Id. at 1246. The court distinguished Adams from United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126
(1" Cir. 1995), in which the defendant claimed his confession was the product of a mental disor-
der characterized by an extreme form of pathological lying. Id.
282. Id.
283. 582 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1998).
284. Bixler, 582 N.W.2d at 253. Bixler was mentally retarded due to a brain injury, and
acted as an adolescent. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. Bixler apparently had a habit of picking scabs off his body and placing them in his
mouth. Ms. Bixler discovered a scab in the clitoral area of their two and a half-year old daughter.
Ms. Bixler then became convinced that her husband placed the scab in her daughter while per-
forming an act of oral sex. Id.
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stood the reason for the interview. 287 The interrogation took place at
the police station.2 8 The police, while interrogating Bixler, told him
that in order to get help with his personal problems, which included a
lack of sex with his wife, "he would have to admit he did 'it."'"2 9 Bix-
ler then provided a detailed statement referencing oral sex with his
daughter. 290 After a second Miranda warning, Bixler agreed to havehis confession taped. 29 1 At trial, the defense proffered the testimony of
a psychologist who had examined Bixler and concluded that he pos-
sessed a character trait of malleability. 29 2  Counsel also represented
that the psychologist would testify regarding interrogation tech-
niques.293 The trial court refused to allow the psychologist's testimony
regarding false confessions. This decision was overturned by the in-
termediate appellate court,294 which concluded that Crane v. Kentucky
all but mandated admissibility.95
However, on appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
Crane did not "open the gates" to expert testimony regarding interro-
gations. 9' The court reasoned that such evidence is "nothing more
than a composite of personal characteristics that might render an indi-
vidual wanting to please an authority figure, and having far less scien-
tific specificity than [a defined mental illness]. '"297 As a result, the
state supreme court reversed the intermediate appellate court's deci-
sion.
In State v. Ritt, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that expert
evidence regarding the interrogation environment invades the province
of the jury.29 The defendant, Kelly Ritt, was convicted of murdering






292. Id. at 254. According to Bixler, he was thirty-ones years old, with a ninth-grade edu-
cation. He further testified that he only admitted to abusing his daughter because the police
promised him treatment for other problems. Id.
293. Id.
294. Bixler v. State, 568 N.W.2d 880 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997).
295. Id. at 884.
296. Bixler v. State, 582 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Minn. 1998).
297. Id.
298. 599 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 1999). On habeas review, the federal district court found
that the Minnesota Supreme Court's upholding of the state trial court's decision to bar expert
testimony did not violate Crane v. Kentucky. Ritt v. Dingle, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1145 (D.
Minn. 2001).
299. Ritt, 599 N.W.2d at 804. The daughter was born with cytomegalovirus, which af-
fected her heart, liver, spleen, hearing, eyesight, and brain. She was fed through a tube and was
under constant care. Id.
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Prior to formal police questioning, Ritt provided some information re-
garding the condition of the home to a fire marshal. 3"0  During later
police questioning, Ritt was informed that "she was free to go at any
time" and that "she was not under arrest. '30 1 Ritt told the detective
that she believed her daughter caused the fire by tossing an afghan rug
out of her crib and onto an electric heater. However, when her state-
ments were found to be inconsistent with the fire marshal's report, the
detective notified Ritt of her rights under Miranda and began to ques-
tion her further.30 2 This additional questioning, preserved on video-
tape, showed Ritt admitting that she threw the afghan rug on the elec-
tric heater.303  In preparing for Ritt's interrogation, the police
formulated a plan based in part on past training in the Reid and Inbau
technique. 304
At trial, the defense moved to suppress Ritt's confession on the
grounds that it was given involuntarily. 35  The defense also sought
testimony from an expert witness, Dr. Ralph Underwager. 0 6 Counsel
cited Crane to support the admissibility of Dr. Underwager's testi-
mony.37 The court denied both the suppression motion and the ad-
mission of any expert testimony regarding the interrogation.3 8 Ritt
stated that Dr. Underwager would testify that psychological coercion
was present during the interrogation."' The trial court concluded Dr.
Underwager's testimony exceeded the scope of Minnesota Rule of
Evidence 702 and posed a danger of creating confusion.310
On appeal, the state supreme court agreed that Ritt's confession
was voluntary and upheld its admission. Additionally, the court ana-
300. Id. at 805. This interview occurred in an interrogation room at the police station. Id.
301. Id. at 806. The detective interviewing Ritt was not in uniform, and he did not carry a
firearm. However, the door to the interview room was shut because of noise in the adjacent
hallway. Id.
302. Id. at 807.
303. Id. The police also interviewed another daughter and ascertained that Ritt had closed
the bedroom door to her disabled daughter's room after the fire started. Furthermore, forensic
chemical analysis indicated the fire was caused by the afghan rug being drenched in nail polish
remover, which is a highly flammable substance. Finally, Ritt had made a series of inculpatory
statements to neighbors about her displeasure toward her disabled daughter. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at808. Ritt argued her statement was "the product of a technique of psychological
interrogation that can and does induce innocent people to confess." Id. She further argued that"the Reid technique of interrogation systematically alters the suspect's perception of reality
through an elaborate web of implicit threats and promises until the suspect believes the confes-
sion is the best alternative, even though he or she is innocent of the crime." Id.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 811-12.




Expert Evidence in False Confession Defenses
lyzed its prior limitations on expert testimony. 311 The court noted that
as a general rule expert testimony is helpful and admissible only "if it
explains a behavioral phenomenon not within the understanding of an
ordinary lay jury, such as battered woman syndrome or the behavior
of sexually abused children." '312 In this case, the court found that a
trier of fact could form its own intelligent decisions regarding the vol-
untariness of Ritt's interrogation.313 The court then adopted the trial
court's rationale that expert evidence regarding false confessions inter-
feres with the truth-finding process of the jury. 14 The court con-
cluded that while Crane permits a defendant to present a complete de-
fense, the Court in Crane did not speak to evidentiary limitations
under the expert evidence rules.31 Thus, to date, Minnesota appears
to hold that false confession evidence rooted in the social model is in-
admissible.
B. Expert Evidence Failing to Meet a Frye or Daubert Standard of
Admissibility: The New Jersey and Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
(C.A.A.F.) Examples
It has been noted that there appears to be little correlation be-
tween Frye and Daubert jurisdictions regarding the admissibility of
false confession expert evidence. Below are two examples where
courts have found psychological review of interrogation evidence in-
compatible with the requirements of Frye or Daubert. Throughout
this Article there are examples where courts conclude that even
though such evidence otherwise qualifies as specialized knowledge, it
is nevertheless precluded because the social model does not qualify on
the basis of reliability. However, it should be noted that cases exist
where the proffered expert psychologist was found not to possess the
requisite degree of expertise for admissibility, without comment from
the court on the social model of false confessions. 316  Below are two
court decisions analyzing the threshold issue of reliability.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 811 (citing State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1989)).
313. Id.
314. Id. at 812. The court stated its reluctance to allow experts to testify about matters that
are generally for the jury's determination and are susceptible to cross-examination. Id. (citing
BixIer v. Minnesota, 582 N.W.2d 252 (Minn. 1998)). In Bixier, the Minnesota Supreme Court
held that the trial judge's conclusion that expert false confession evidence failed Minnesota Rule
of Evidence 702 was legally sound. The court further found that the exclusion of expert evidence
on false confessions does not violate a defendant's right to put forth a defense as required by the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
315. Id.
316. See, e.g., Beltran v. State, 700 So. 2d 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); State v. Kolb, 930
P.2d 1238 (Wyo. 1996); State v. Tellier, 526 A.2d 941 (Me. 1987).
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1. New Jersey
As noted above, several cases involve more than one issue re-
garding expert evidence and false confessions. For example, in State
v. Free, a New Jersey appellate court recognized that a confession is
generally assumed to be reliable.3" The court also took note of nu-
merous cases in which people "were erroneously convicted and im-
prisoned on the basis of persuasive confessions to crimes they did not
commit."'318  However, this court further recognized that while it is
impossible to estimate the statistical frequency of false confessions,
modern police interrogation techniques are psychologically power-
ful.319
In Free, the suspect confessed to murder after a seventeen-hour
interrogation. 20 The trial court, in permitting the defense testimony
of Dr. Kassin, noted the compelling length of Free's interrogation. 2'
The prosecution, on a direct appeal of the trial court's ruling, objected
on the basis that such evidence invades the province of the jury. 22
Additionally, the prosecution argued that false confession evidence
was not sufficiently reliable for admissibility under New Jersey's ex-
pert evidence rules. 23
317. 798 A.2d 83, 84 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002).
318. Free, 798 A.2d at 84. The court specifically noted, "Recent DNA exoneration cases in
the Untied States have confirmed that the elicitation of false confessions continues unabated.
Among the first sixty-two prisoners exonerated by DNA evidence, fifteen had given full or par-
tial confessions." Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. According to the court, Patrick Free was taken into custody on August 1, 1998, at
5:18 P.M., and orally confessed on tape at 10:29 A.M. the following day. During the period be-
tween his intake and confession, he was interrogated by a team of investigators and tested on a
polygraph. He consented to be tested by polygraph and to further questioning based on the re-
sults of that test. According to police records, he first confessed to the murder at 4:39 A.M.
However, he provided a revised statement at 6:02 A.M., and a third statement at 10:02 A.M. On
several occasions, he was interrogated by four detectives at the same time. Id.
321. Id. At trial, Free offered testimony from Dr. Kassin, who testified in a pretrial motion
in limine that false confessions do occur as a result of police interrogations. The state countered
this testimony with a psychiatrist, Dr. Michael Welner, who testified that Dr. Kassin's studies
(among others) on false confessions lacked reliable scientific foundation. While he agreed the
general typology of false confessions (voluntary false, coerced-compliant, and coerced-
internalized) may serve as a useful description of the process, he acknowledged that there has
never been an acceptable predictor as to whether a confession is true, false, or questionable. Id.
In addition, the trial court did not find Dr. Kassin's evidence based in science, but rather ac-
cepted it as "specialized knowledge." Id.
Interestingly, it was Dr. Kassin who earlier wrote that it is impossible to know the frequency
and statistical relevance of false confessions. The court appeared to adopt Dr. Kassin's pretrial
testimony as a reason for denying his trial testimony before the trier of fact.
322. Id.
323. Id.
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The appellate court initially noted a defendant's right to present
to the trier of fact evidence relative to the credibility of his confes-
sion.324 The court also acknowledged that other jurisdictions permit
psychological testimony on the credibility of a confession. 32' How-
ever, the court found that in other jurisdictions, expert psychological
testimony was admissible only in cases where the defendant had a
mental disorder relevant to the confession.326 In Free, the defendant
wanted to present generalized psychological evidence regarding police
interrogation techniques.3 27  The appellate court, siding with the
prosecution, found that the trial court erred in its application of the
New Jersey Rules of Evidence to expert testimony.328 The appellate
court concluded that Dr. Kassin could not meet the threshold re-
quirements for expert testimony.329
In part, the court appeared to consider expert social science-
based evidence regarding interrogations as too amorphous to meet a"general acceptance" requirement. 3 ' New Jersey maintains the origi-
nal Frye standard of admissibility, and the court recognized its restric-
tive approach. 331 The court did not foreclose the possible admissibility
of expert psychiatric or psychological testimony as to a pertinent con-
dition of the defendant, such as a mental disorder, that pertained to his
confession.3 32 However, Free did not advance a specific mental illness
as a defense.333
Additionally, the court recognized that under New Jersey Rule of
Evidence 702, the nature of the expert testimony offered "must be
such as will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to de-
termine a fact in issue. ' 3 4 This wording, as well as the logic of Bixler




328. Id. The court cited to New Jersey Rule of Evidence 702, which reads as follows: "If
scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, ex-
perience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." N.J.
R. EVID. 702.
329. Free, 798 A.2d at 83.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 84 (citing State v. Spann, 617 A.2d 247 (N.J. 1993)). In Spann, the court held,
"The general acceptance by the relevant scientific community test established in Frye, substan-
tially is still the law in New Jersey." Id. The court in Free also cited to State v. Harvey, 699
A.2d 596 (N.J. 1997). In Harvey, the court held, "[I]n criminal cases we continue to apply the
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and Ritt, informed the court's holding that expert psychology-based
testimony offered little to assist the understanding of the trier of fact.
2. United States v. Griffin
In United States v. Griffin, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Armed Forces (C.A.A.F.) held that the trial court did not err
when it excluded false confession evidence. 3  Griffin was initially ac-
cused by his wife of molesting his daughter in 1991 at Whiteman Air
Force Base (AFB), Missouri. 36 After an investigation, it was deter-
mined that his wife's allegations were unsubstantiated. In 1994, Grif-
fin received orders to report to Minot AFB, North Dakota. 37 As part
of this duty transfer, he was required to update his security clearance,
which included a polygraph examination. 38 During the polygraph ex-
amination, Griffin's answers regarding the incident revealed some de-
ception on his part. During a post-examination session, Griffin ad-
mitted to an investigator that his daughter "touched his erect penis. '
On this basis, Griffin was charged with two false official statements,340
indecent liberties with his daughter,341 and communicating a threat.342
At trial, the defense sought to suppress Griffin's statements on
the grounds that they were coerced. The defense attempted to intro-
duce testimony from Dr. Rex Frank, a psychologist, regarding "false
confessions" and "coercion in interrogations." ''  According to the
court, the sum total of Dr. Frank's pretrial work consisted of the fol-
335. 50 M.J. 278, 282 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1999).
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. Although polygraph examinations are common during security clearance reviews,
Miranda rights are not generally given since the purpose is related to national security fitness,
rather than criminal investigation. Instead, polygraph subjects are provided with "privacy act
rights," and are informed of the purpose of the exam and the voluntary nature of the exam.
339. Id.
340. Id. (noting that false official statements are punishable under Article 107 of the Uni-
form Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 907 (1998)).
341. Id. at 279 (stating that indecent liberties with a child are punishable under Article 134,
paragraph 87 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 934).
342. Id. (noting that communicating a threat is punishable under Article 134, paragraph
110 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 934)).
343. Id. at 281. At the time of Griffin, Dr. Frank's background in false confessions was less
compelling than that of Dr. Ofshe or Dr. Leo. According to the court:
In 1993 [Dr. Frank] began studying areas of false confessions and coercion in interro-
gations. He examined about twenty years' worth of research materials, including a
study of 350 cases, conducted in 1987, where suspects confessed but were later deter-
mined to be innocent based on other evidence. Of those 350 cases, the study con-
cluded that 49 involved coerced confessions. He testified that there was a problem
with the study because "they did not differentiate between the issue of coercion and
the issue of torture in police interviews that resulted in a confession."
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lowing: Dr. Frank "spent a total of only six hours with [Griffin]," in-
terviewed the special agent that took Griffin's statements, interviewed
an unrelated person who had been interviewed by the agent on a for-
mer occasion, and listened to an interview of Griffin's spouse. 344 Dr.
Frank testified during a pretrial motion hearing to determine admissi-
bility. Based on his examination of Griffin, Dr. Frank concluded that
Griffin's confession was consistent with a coerced-compliant confes-
sion.345 What makes this case different from the others discussed in
this Article is the fact that the prosecution countered Dr. Frank with a
psychologist who testified that the subject area of false confessions
"has not reached scientific acceptability." '346 The trial judge held that
false confession psychology evidence was not proper subject matter for
expert testimony and that the proffered evidence was more likely to
confuse than help the trier of fact.347 Additionally, the trial judge held
that Dr. Frank's evidence had little probative value.34
On appeal, the C.A.A.F. reviewed Military Rule of Evidence
(MRE) 702, the military court companion rule to FRE 702. Addi-
tionally, the C.A.A.F. was bound by Daubert as well as United States
v. Houser,349 a military law counterpart to Daubert. In Houser, the
C.A.A.F. (then known as the U.S. Court of Military Appeals) set out
six factors that must be satisfied by the proponent of the expert testi-
mony. These factors include (1) the qualification of the expert; (2) the
subject matter of the expert testimony; (3) the basis for the expert tes-
timony; (4) the legal relevance of the evidence; (5) the reliability of the
evidence; and (6) the probative value outweighing the other considera-
tions outlined in MRE 403.350 The C.A.A.F. concluded that an expert
witness may not testify as "a human lie detector."' 35 ' While the court
did not create a per se rule prohibiting psychological testimony regard-
344. Id. at 282. In terms of assessing Griffin's test scores, Dr. Frank concluded Griffin was
a "highly compliant individual."
345. Id. Dr. Frank did admit that psychologists have no scientific means of determining
whether a confession is true or false. He further testified that psychologists can only "understand
some characteristics that make a person vulnerable to provide information which is erroneous."
Id.
346. Id. The prosecution called Lt. Colonel Nancy Slicner, a licensed psychologist with a
doctorate in psychology, who was the Chief of the Air Force's Behavioral Science Unit at the Air
Force Office of Special Investigations. She testified regarding several variables that render gen-
eralized conclusions unreliable. These variables include the interviewer, the interview environ-
ment, and the psychology and personality of the person being interviewed. She further testified
that no accepted studies show a statistically significant correlation between a specific personality
trait and the likelihood of somebody falsely confessing. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. 36 M.J. 392, 397-400 (C.M.A. 1993).
350. Id. at 397.
351. Id.
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ing false confessions, it appeared to be concerned with the issue of sci-
entific credibility. The Air Force Court of Criminal Appeals had pre-
viously held that Dr. Frank's testimony "did not have the necessary
reliability to help the trier of fact" and that his methods lacked
reliability under the Daubert factors for admissibility.31 2  The
C.A.A.F. did not differ from this conclusion in its review of the lower
courtFederal and state jurisdictions rarely view military case law as
persuasive authority, but Griffin may be an exception. Like Schef-
fer,35 3 which involved polygraph evidence and also originated in an Air
Force court-martial, Griffin provides guidance to jurisdictions in re-
viewing both an expert's qualifications to testify and in assessing the
reliability of false confession psychology. While Griffin did not in-
volve psychiatric testimony, it presents a solid framework for limiting
false confession evidence to that which is based in the narrow purview
of the medical model.
C. Use and Limits of Expert Testimony on Interrogation Conditions: The
Seventh Circuit and Indiana Examples of Reliance on a Social Model
False confession theory, in part, analyzes interrogation tech-
niques and conditions thought to cause people to adopt the allegations
against them as truthful. As noted above, there is a small, albeit grow-
ing body of studies in this field.3" 4 Interrogation conditions are neces-
sarily viewed on a social model because of the prevalence of statistical
correlations between techniques and admissions. Two examples be-
low provide context to the social model's use.
1. United States v. Hall
In United States v. Hall, the Seventh Circuit ultimately permitted
evidence as to the coerciveness of general interrogation conditions. 355
Hall actually consists of two published appellate cases and one pub-
lished trial decision reflecting a series of appeals and cross-appeals.5 6
Hall was suspected of murdering Jessica Roach, a fifteen-year-old girl
352. United States v. Griffin, 1997 WL 517002, at **10-11 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Aug. 11,
1997).
353. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998); see supra notes 57-69 and accompany-
ing text for the facts and holding of Scheffer.
354. Section III of this Article provides an overview of false confession studies.
355. 93 F.3d 1337 (7th Cir. 1996) [hereinafter Hall I].
356. Hall 1, 93 F.3d at 1337; United States v. Hall, 974 F. Supp. 1198 (C.D. Ill. 1997)
[hereinafter Hall II]; United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095 (7th Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Hall III].
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in Vermillion County, Illinois, in 1993. 3s7 He was also suspected of
following other girls in his van during the same period as the mur-
der.358 Moreover, Hall was previously interrogated by another police
department in Indiana regarding the disappearance of a female college
student in 1993. 311 In March 1994, a Wabash County, Indiana, detec-
tive advised him to seek help at a mental health clinic, which Hall
did.36° The detective was able to garner a basic assessment of Hall
from the clinic, and this assessment was shared with local law en-
31forcement agencies.
In November 1994, a detective summoned Hall to the Wabash
police station for an interview with a detective from Vermillion
County. 362 Although Hall was initially questioned about stalking two
girls in Vermillion County, the questioning progressed to the topic of
Jessica Roach.363 Over a two-day period, which included a polygraph
examination and FBI interrogation, Hall confessed to murdering Jes-
sica Roach.364 The interrogation was not electronically recorded, but
according to agent notes, Hall provided a detailed confession.36 At
trial, the defense had both a psychologist and a psychiatrist testify as
to Hall's mental and emotional problems.366 Hall also sought expert
testimony from Dr. Ofshe as to the coercive nature of the interroga-
tion.367 However, Dr. Ofshe's testimony was not admitted by the trial
court.368
In Hall I, the Seventh Circuit first assessed Dr. Ofshe's proffered
testimony in light of Daubert. The court noted Dr. Ofshe's creden-
tials, his methodology, and his conclusions.3 69 His methodology, the
court noted, was based in social science. 370  The court acknowledged
that both social science and psychology pose "both analytical and
357. Hall 1, 93 F.3d at 1339. The victim was found in a farm field after being run over by
a combine. As a result, the autopsy was inconclusive as to the cause of death. Id.
358. Id. According to the court, Hall had a habit of stalking teenage girls. There were sev-







365. Id. at 1341.
366. Id.
367. Id. The district court rejected Dr. Ofshe's testimony in its entirety on the basis that
"it would add nothing to what the jury would know from common experience." Moreover, the
district court did not permit the psychologist to testify as to Hall's character trait for suggestibil-
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practical difficulties for courts attempting to apply FRE 702. '
However, the court reasoned that disorders do exist, and Hall's con-
fession went to the heart of the prosecution's case.372 The court found
it problematic that the district court did not conduct a Daubert hearing
as to Dr. Ofshe's proffered testimony and remanded the case.3 73 It is
worth noting that the court appeared concerned that the Vermillion
County police obtained a confession from another individual who
claimed to have killed Jessica Roach.3 74
On remand to the district court,375 the prosecution objected to
Dr. Ofshe's testimony on the basis of Daubert.376  The district court
first analyzed a tension within Daubert between scientific and special-
ized knowledge. The district court also distinguished between "hard
science" and "specialized knowledge. '377 The court further set a re-
quirement for social science testimony, which necessitated that the ex-
pert testify, inter alia, as to the longevity or the particular field, the lit-
erature written about the subject, the methods of peer review, the
371. Id. (citing Robert C. Showalter, Distinguishing Science from Pseudo -Science in Psychia-
try: Expert Testimony in the Post-Daubert Era, 2 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 211 (1995)).
372. Id. at 1343. The court analogized to a hypothetical case involving an intent offense
centered on abusive language where the defendant suffered from Tourette's Syndrome but was
unable to present psychiatric testimony. Id. The court also noted that Hall's confession con-
sisted of a police agent writing Hall's statements for him, and then getting Hall to sign the con-
fession. The court appeared to be concerned with the lack of corroborative evidence linking
Hall's confession to the actual murder of Jessica Roach. See id.
373. Id. The court determined,
Properly conducted social-science research often shows that commonly held beliefs
are in error. Dr. Ofshe's testimony, assuming its scientific validity, would have let the
jury know a phenomenon known as false confessions exists, how to recognize it, and
how to decide whether it fits the facts of the case being tried.
Id.
374. Id. at 1340. It must be noted that this confession was not the product of an interroga-
tion, but rather a volunteered statement in which apparently no party placed any credence. Id.
375. Hall I, 974 F. Supp 1198.
376. Id.
377. Id. (citing Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1349-50 (6th Cir. 1994)). In Berry,
the court viewed the distinction as follows:
The distinction between scientific and nonscientific expert testimony is a critical one.
By way of illustration, if one wanted to explain to a jury how a bumblebee is able to
fly, an aeronautical engineer might be a helpful witness. Since flight principles have
some universality, the expert could apply general principles to the case of the bumble-
bee. Conceivably, even if he had never seen a bumblebee, he still would be qualified
to testify, as long as he was familiar with its component parts. On the other hand, if
one wanted to prove that bumblebees always take off into the wind, a beekeeper with
no scientific training at all would be an acceptable expert witness if a proper founda-
tion were laid for his conclusions. The foundation would not relate to his formal
training, but to his firsthand observations. In other words, the beekeeper does not
know any more about flight principles than the jurors, but he has seen a lot more
bumblebees than they have.
Berry, 25 F.3d at 1349-50.
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quantity of observational or other studies in that field, and the general
consensus or debate in the field as to what the raw data means.378 The
court noted a number of academic treatises on social science and con-
cluded Dr. Ofshe's testimony was admissible under FRE 702 because
of the liberal nature of Daubert.379 The district court then held that
Dr. Ofshe's testimony, while not scientific, could be admissible as
specialized knowledge."' 0 However, the court limited Dr. Ofshe's tes-
timony to the correlation between false confessions and various factors
believed to be linked to them.3"' He was not permitted to testify about
matters of causation, and he was specifically forbidden to testify that
the interrogation methods caused Hall to falsely confess.38 2 Moreover,
Dr. Ofshe was prohibited from testifying with regard to any of Hall's
post-confession statements of further guilt on direct examination. 83
Finally, the court prohibited Dr. Ofshe from testifying as to Hall's
psychological or psychiatric impairments.384 Hall was once more con-
victed after retrial.385
As a result of Hall's retrial and conviction, several new issues
arose in his next appeal. 386  However, the court appeared little con-
cerned about the district court limiting Dr. Ofshe's testimony. One
important issue involved the scope of rebuttal to false confession tes-
timony. At trial, Hall was permitted to introduce expert psychiatric
testimony as to certain personality disorders that made him more sus-
ceptible to suggestion and eager to please. 87 In rebuttal, the prosecu-
tion introduced an expert to testify that those same characteristics as-
sociated with Hall's particular personality disorders are often found in
sex offenders.388 The court held there was no abuse of discretion in
this rebuttal. 89
378. Hall II, 974 F. Supp. at 1198.






385. Hall I1, 165 F.3d at 1095.




389. Id. The court stated, "It is well established that the admission of rebuttal lies within
the discretion of the trial court and appellate courts will not interfere with the trial court's ruling
unless there is a clear abuse of discretion." Id. (citing Mercado v. Ahmed, 974 F.2d 863, 872
(7th Cir. 1992)).
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Proponents of false confession admissibility under the social
model view Hall as a landmark decision.39° While this may be true to
the jurisdictions Hall has influenced, its holding is tenuous given the
gatekeeper role of trial judges. Moreover, as noted above, a survey of
case law indicates courts are reticent to permit evidence of interroga-
tion psychology because it invades the province of the trier of fact.
Additionally, Hall appears to open the door for profile testimony dur-
ing rebuttal. Profile evidence is likely to be admissible as rebuttal to
social model-based testimony as well.391 This is because the defense is
essentially presenting to the trier of fact psychological evidence of the
defendant's innocence. This is significant to a defendant's tactical
choices at trial, as certain profile methodology has greater acceptance
both in psychiatry and psychology. 92 Few defense counsel want a
situation where the prosecution is permitted to introduce expert evi-
dence to the effect the defendant shares common characteristics asso-
ciated with people who tend to commit the charged offense.
2. Indiana: Miller v. State
In Miller v. State, the Indiana Supreme Court ruled that interro-
gation techniques may be a proper area for expert testimony.3 93 Miller
was initially suspected of murder, but prior to any interrogation, his
name and description appeared on the television news.394 On learning
this fact, Miller went to the local police station to assert his inno-
cence.39 He arrived at 5:30 P.M. and was placed alone in a locked in-
terview room.396 After two hours, a detective began gathering back-
ground information while interviewing Miller. 97 Miller was provided
390. WRIGHTSMAN & KASSIN, CONFESSIONS IN THE COURTROOM, supra note 159, at
92.
391. See, e.g., United States v. Stitt, 250 F.3d 878, 897-98 (4th Cir. 2001). In Stitt, the
court defined rebuttal evidence for the penalty stage of trial:
Both the definition of rebuttal evidence and the precedent in this Circuit make clear
that, when otherwise inadmissible, rebuttal evidence must be reasonably tailored to
the evidence it seeks to refute. Rebuttal evidence is defined as "evidence given to ex-
plain, repel, counteract, or disprove facts given in evidence by the opposing party."
Id.
392. See, e.g., People v. Stoll, 783 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989); Paul R. Lees-Hayley, Psychodiag-
nostic Test Usage by Forensic Psychologists, 10 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCH. 25 (1992) (listing fre-
quency of various tests conducted by psychologists).
393. 770 N.E.2d 763 (Ind. 2002).
394. Miller, 770 N.E.2d. at 768.
395. Id.
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with a Miranda advisement early in the interview.39 For a time,
Miller denied any involvement in the murder and denied even being
near the victim's office.399 However, the detective provided Miller
with "evidence" that he was seen outside the victim's office and that
Miller's fingerprints had been found in the victim's office.4"' The de-
tective even told Miller that the victim died of natural causes.4 1 None
of this was true, though a witness did see Miller in the victim's build-
ing.4" 2 The detective went so far as to suggest that the victim could
have died from an accident involving Miller.40 3 At 1:45 A.M., Miller
told the detective that he accidentally killed the victim.40 4 Miller then
agreed to have his statement recorded, at which time Miller acknowl-
edged his Miranda rights and waived them.40 ' Once more, Miller pro-
vided an oral statement admitting the victim died in his presence.0 6
At no time did Miller appear to be intoxicated or under medication.4 7
He was forty years old and employed, but later it was discovered that
he suffered slight mental retardation.4 8 In fact, Miller had a prior re-
cord which suggests he had knowledge of the criminal justice sys-
tem.40 9 At trial, the court found Miller's confession voluntary and ex-
cluded testimony from Dr. Ofshe regarding interrogation
398. Id. When Miller initially denied being at the apartment house where the victim was
murdered, which was contrary to the information contained in the police investigation, the detec-





403. Id. At approximately 1:00 A.M., Miller and the detective took a break, at which time
Miller was provided with a soda and the opportunity to use the restroom. Id.
404. Id. at 769. According to the court, Miller told the detective that he encountered the
victim in her office on the night of her death, and that he pushed the door open to her office.
Miller further stated that she told him to "get the hell out," and that she started to back up and
fall. In addition, Miller maintained that the victim's injuries occurred when he attempted to
catch her. Id.
405. Id. Miller's confession was captured on videotape. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id. On videotape, Miller stated that he entered the apartment house to contact an ac-
quaintance. When he failed to find the acquaintance, he saw the victim standing in her office
door, closing the door. Miller then went to find another acquaintance and again saw the victim,
closing the office door a second time. When he approached her and opened the door, she told
him to "get out of here." She then fell down the stairs. Id. However, when the detective con-
fronted Miller with evidence that the victim had been raped, Miller responded, "Well, she
wasn't raped by me, sir. I wouldn't, you know, do nothing like that to no older lady." Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
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conditions.41° The trial court did not prohibit Miller from cross-
examining detectives as to the conditions of the interrogation.41'
On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court began its analysis by sug-
gesting that a trial court's determination of a confession's voluntari-
ness does not preclude the defense from challenging its weight and
credibility.4t2 The court then held that the content of Miller's interro-
gation was not a proper matter for exclusion.413 The court concluded
that Dr. Ofshe's testimony "would have assisted the jury regarding
the psychology of relevant aspects of police interrogation of mentally
retarded persons, topics outside common knowledge and experi-
ence. "414
However, the court did acknowledge that some if this evidence
might violate Indiana's prohibition against opinion testimony as to the
truth or falsity of a defendant's statements. 41  Also, the court did not
assess whether Dr. Ofshe's testimony could withstand all expert ad-
missibility rules, including the "scientific" basis on which it was
based. Thus, Miller is of value only as an example where a court held
expert evidence regarding generalized interrogation psychology would
be helpful to the trier of fact and did not, per se, invade the truth-
seeking province of the tier of fact. It is important to distinguish
Miller from other cases, as the court noted the confession constituted
the overwhelming weight of the prosecution's case.416
410. Id. at 770. The prosecution initially filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude all tes-
timony regarding the interrogation process as well as the truthfulness of the defendant's state-
ments/confession. Id.
Dr. Ofshe was offered as an expert in the field of "social psychology of police interrogation
and false confessions." The trial court first heard Dr. Ofshe's testimony out of the presence of
the trier of fact. He identified two principal features of analyzing police interrogation: evidence
ploys and minimization. He also testified with regard to the significance of the friendly behavior
of the detective. Dr. Ofshe concluded that the interrogation was designed on psychological prin-
ciples to "drive a suspect's confidence down to the point where they think it is virtually certain
that they will be arrested, tried, and convicted." Id. at 770-71.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 772.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 774.
415. Id. The Indiana Court of Appeals had earlier dealt with the issue of Dr. Ofshe's tes-
timony invading the province of the trier of fact in Callis v. State, 684 N.E.2d 233 (Ind. Ct. App.
1997). Id. at 773. In Callis, Dr. Ofshe's testimony was limited to generalized psychological evi-
dence regarding interrogations. On appeal, Callis asserted this limitation was cause for reversible
error. The court disagreed and sustained Callis's conviction.
416. Miller, 770 N.E.2d at 773.
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D. Expert Testimony Involving a Defendant's Character for Malleability:
The First Circuit, Florida, and Nebraska Embrace the Medical Model
Specific psychiatric conditions may be relevant to the credibility
and weight the trier of fact must place on the confession. However, to
date, there is little legal consensus as to which condition is relevant to
credibility determinations. Certainly, specific mental illnesses listed in
the DSM IV417 may give rise to a character for malleability (or sug-
gestibility) in the interrogation setting. For instance, courts have
found it error to suppress evidence of anxiety conditions"' and long-
term substance induced blackout impairments.419 Likewise, some con-
ditions, such as diminished mental capacity, have not been found rele-
vant to the question of a confession's credibility.42° Because of a lack
of general consensus regarding specified mental illnesses linked to
malleability, little persuasive guidance exists for admissibility issues.
However, two examples analyzed below utilize the medical model in
determining a specific mental illness relevant to weight and credibility.
1. United States v. Shay
In United States v. Shay, the First Circuit held that where a de-
fendant suffered from a well-recognized mental disorder, the district
court erred when it suppressed psychiatric testimony.42 Shay was ini-
tially arrested because his father discovered a "suspicious package"
under his vehicle and called the police.422 While the police examined
this package, it exploded, killing one police officer and injuring an-
other.423 Although Shay initially made inculpatory statements to the
police, he made a number of conflicting statements to the media as
well as to his friends. For example, Shay told the police that "he was
sorry about it and wished he could turn back the hands of time. 424
Shay also told reporters he knew who planted the bomb, but only after
the fact.42 Finally, Shay bragged to a cellmate that "he was the boom-
417. See supra note 143 for an explanation of the DSM IV.
418. See, e.g., People v. Parks, 579 P.2d 76 (Colo. 1978). In Parks, the court held that ex-
pert psychiatric testimony regarding the defendant's mental ability to make free and intelligent
decisions at the time of his or her arrest is generally relevant to the issues before the court. Id.
419. See, e.g., State v. Whitton, 770 So. 2d 844 (La. Ct. App. 2000). However, there are
cases in which the court found that a specific illness was not relevant. See, e.g., People v. Page, 2
Cal. App. 4th 161 (1991).
420. See, e.g., People v. Howard, 575 N.W.2d 16 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997).
421. 57 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 1995).
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boom man," and was the one "who killed the Boston Cop. 42 6 He was
charged as part of a conspiracy to kill his father.4 27
At trial, the defense attempted to argue that Shay's statements
were unreliable for three reasons. First, Shay suffered from a compul-
sive need to gain attention, and as a result, he created grandiose sto-
ries.428 Several lay witnesses were permitted to testify as to this trait. 29
Second, the defense argued that Shay's statements were conflicting and
did not match the facts of the case.43° Again, the defense was able to
present evidence of this to the jury in the form of lay witness testi-
mony. Finally, the defense sought to offer testimony from Dr. Robert
Phillips, a psychiatrist, to the effect that Shay suffered from a recog-
nized mental disorder known as pseudologia fantastica.43' The district
court, however, suppressed Dr. Phillips's testimony, ruling that it
would be likely to mislead the trier of fact and delve into inadmissible
areas, such as an ultimate issue.4 32
The First Circuit remanded the case. In its opinion, the appel-
late court first examined the psychiatric condition or mental illness
that Shay suffered from.433 According to the court, pseudologues repre-
sent fantasies as real occurrences that often involve dramatic, grandi-
ose, and exaggerated events.434 The court also opined that it might not
be necessary for Shay to testify in order to avail himself of this de-
fense.435 The court then conducted an analysis under both FRE 702
and Daubert, and found that the district court had abused its discre-
tion by preventing Dr. Phillips from testifying. The court also found
that Dr. Phillips's testimony would have provided the jury with coun-
terintuitive testimony.436 The finding that Dr. Phillips's testimony
would provide counterintuitive evidence to the trier of fact was based
on the proposition that a person with Shay's diagnosis might make
426. Id.
427. Id. The prosecution's theory was that Shay and a friend named Alfred Trenkler con-




431. Id. The court recognized that pseudologiafantastica is categorized as a factitious dis-
order in the DSM III-R and is sometimes referred to as Munchausen's Disease. Further, it is a
variant of lying that is often characterized as an extreme form of pathological lying. Id.
432. Id. at 130 n.2.
433. Id. at 134.
434. Id. at 129 n.1 (citing Charles W. Dithrich, Pseudologia Fantastica, Dissociation, and
Potential Space in Child Treatment, 72 INT. J. PSYCHO. ANAL. 657 (1991)).
435. Id. at 134. Here, the court reasoned that under FRE 806, a declarant's out-of-court
statement "opened the door" to the declarant's credibility. Id. The court acknowledged FRE
806 does not include statements admitted under FRE 801(d)(2)(A) (party admissions), and sim-
ply put forth an analogy for the admissibility of credibility evidence. Id.
436. Id.
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statements against their interest for reasons other than the truth.437
The court further held that such evidence would significantly buttress
Shay's testimony that he lied about conspiring to kill his father.438
The First Circuit did not expressly hold that Shay had an absolute
right to Dr. Phillips's testimony. Rather, the court held that if, on
remand, the lower court decided that Dr. Phillips' testimony was
admissible under FRE 403, then exclusion of his testimony could not
constitute harmless error.4 39  This holding was premised on the cen-
trality of Shay's inculpatory statements to the prosecution's case.44
2. Carter v. State
In Carter v. State, a Florida appellate court reversed a murder
conviction on the basis that the trial court had erroneously suppressed
evidence in the form of expert witness testimony regarding a false con-
fession.44' In this case, the defense sought to introduce testimony from
Dr. Robert Defrancisco, a psychologist, regarding the defendant's
mental status at the time of his confession.442 At trial, Carter testified
as to the conditions of his interrogation. 43  His description differed
significantly from the description given by the police interrogator.
Carter proffered that, through the psychologist's testimony, it would
be established that Carter was only moderately literate with an I.Q. of
seventy-nine and a sixth-grade reading level,444 that his short-term
memory was significantly below average, and that he had subnormal
comprehension.44 The psychologist would further testify that Carter
suffered from bipolar disorder and manic depression, and that Carter
had a history of alcohol abuse.4 6 Based on this testimony, the defense
intended to attack the voluntariness of the confession before the trier
of fact. 447  Finally, the defense also offered to demonstrate Carter's
lack of comprehension through the Grisso Test.44' As a result of the
437. Id. at 133.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 134.
440. Id. n.7. The court stated, "Here the statements at issue were vital to the government's
case. The district court acknowledged the importance of the statements to the government's case
at a side bar conference on the fourteenth day of trial when it observed that without Shay Jr.'s
statements, 'the government would be sunk."' Id.
441. 697 So. 2d 529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
442. Id. at 534.
443. Id. at 531.




448. Id. Designed by Dr. Tom Grisso, the Grisso Test is intended to assist a forensic ex-
pert in determining whether a juvenile who has waived his rights actually comprehended (1)
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prosecution's motion in limine, the trial court suppressed all psycho-
logical testimony at trial.449
On appeal, a Florida appellate court concluded that this suppres-
sion of expert evidence constituted reversible error "primarily because
the prosecution argued the bulk of its case from Carter's confession
weighing the testimony of the investigators against that of Carter." '
While the case does not provide a detailed analysis of the issues re-
lated to the admissibility of expert testimony, it does illuminate two
recurring themes found in cases where false confession expert testi-
mony is permitted. First, the defendant possessed a specific mental
illness-in this case, bipolar disorder and manic depression. Thus,
the testimony was rooted in a medical model rather than a social
model. Second, the defendant testified in his own defense. It must be
reiterated, however, that Carter challenged the voluntariness of his
confession rather than proclaiming a false confession. Accordingly,
this holding appears to be closer to the holding of Crane v. Kentucky,
rather than cases that involve a simple challenge to the credibility of a
confession.
3. State v. Buechler
In State v. Buechler, the defendant was charged with murder. 45
1
Specifically, the prosecution alleged that the defendant killed a drug
distributor after receiving marijuana from him.4" 2 The evidence
what was being said, as well as (2) the significance and implications of the statement of Miranda
rights. Anticipating the State's objection to Dr. Defrancisco's opinions, the trial court allowed a
voir dire examination, during which the expert indicated that the Grisso Test is not a commonly
used, nationally-recognized test, and that the defense's attempt to use the Grisso Test results to
challenge the appellant's ability to comprehend his Miranda rights was "very unusual." The
appellate court, in turn, held, "[W]e conclude that, with respect to the Grisso Test results, the
trial court properly found that the defense had not laid an adequate foundation to satisfy the re-
quirements of Frye .. " The State's objection was sustained, and Dr. Defrancisco was not al-
lowed to opine as to whether the appellant had knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights. Id.
at 533.
449. Id. at 533.
450. Id. The court noted that "[t]he exclusion of Dr. Defrancisco's testimony deprived the
jury of relevant, material information that could have helped them to gauge the appellant's credi-
bility and to decide how much weight to give the evidence relating to the waiver of rights form
and the incriminating statements." Id.
451. 572 N.W.2d 65 (Neb. 1998).
452. Id. at 68. The State's theory of Buechler's guilt rested on his confession. Buechler
admitted to driving Efrain Hemandez and Andrew Requejo in his pickup. During this drive,
Hernandez "made fun" of Buechler's driving and, at some point, Buechler stopped the truck and
shot Hernandez. Buechler further confessed that he shot Hernandez in the left eye, but denied
shooting him in the body. The pathologist was unable to verify where Hernandez was shot be-
cause of the decomposed state of Hernandez's body. In fact, over a year had elapsed from the
murder to the recovery of the body. Furthermore, after-the-fact witnesses provided conflicting
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against defendant Buechler consisted of a videotaped confession as
well as statements that were made by a co-conspirator. At the time of
the confession, Buechler was a "daily heavy user of methampheta-
mine, cocaine, and marijuana.""'n A clinical psychologist that was re-
tained by the defense conducted a mental health examination of
Buechler and diagnosed him with major depression disorder, attention
deficit disorder, anxiety disorder, and paranoid personality disorder." 4
In addition, the psychologist opined that Buechler was "in the throes
of methamphetamine withdrawal" at the time of his confession.4"'
The psychologist reviewed Buechler's videotaped confession and was
set to testify that Buechler was in "a suggestible state."4 6 The prose-
cution succeeded in suppressing the psychologist's testimony.
The Nebraska Supreme Court, relying on both Shay and Hall
III, concluded that it was reversible error to suppress the psycholo-
gist's testimony.4 7 The court first began its analysis under Crane and
determined that such evidence goes to the heart of the right to conduct
a defense. The court then reviewed Nebraska's four-part test for de-
termining expert admissibility.5 ' The court further noted that
Buechler had testified at trial.459 The Nebraska court then reviewed a
number of other state jurisdictions and concluded that the trial court
had abused its discretion in suppressing the expert testimony.46 ° The
court noted that the psychologist's testimony was not proffered to tell"the jury how to decide the case or what result should be reached on
any issue to be resolved by it, but, rather, to explain Buechler's mental
state at the time of the recorded confession."461  The Nebraska Su-
preme Court also appeared to find a lack of evidence interlocking
Buechler's confession to the actual murder.462 As a result, the court
testimony as to statements made by both Buechler and Requejo. At some point after confessing,
Buechler claimed Requejo shot Hemandez. Id.
453. Id. at 68.




458. Id. at 72. This test, which mirrors Daubert, is as follows: (1) Does the witness qualify
as an expert?; (2) Is the testimony relevant?; (3) Will the expert's testimony assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or determine a controverted factual issue?; and (4) Should the expert's
testimony be excluded because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumula-
tive evidence? Id.
459. Id. at 69.
460. Id. The court reviewed Carter v. State, 697 So. 2d 529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997),
discussed above, and People v. Gilliam, 670 N.E.2d 606, 619 (I1. 1996), also discussed above.
461. Id. at 73.
462. Id. at 74. The court noted, "As there was no physical evidence tying Buechler to the
murder, the strongest evidence of the State's case was Buechler's recorded confession, which was
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determined that the psychologist's testimony was an essential part of
Buechler's defense, and would have assisted the jury in determining
the crucial issue of Buechler's credibility at trial.463 Finally, the court
concluded that its decision was not that Buechler had falsely con-
fessed, but rather that a jury was entitled to make that judgment.464
V. HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIO
At 4:30 A.M. on a cold winter morning in the city of Anytown,
U.S.A., Jane Doe awoke to find a strange man in her bedroom. He as-
saulted and raped her. However, because of a medical condition
caused by a side-effect of a prescription drug, he was unable to ejacu-
late, leaving no DNA. When she asked him if her husband is "in on
it," he replies no. The assailant stabbed Mrs. Doe and beat her over
the head with a frying pan. The pan was dented as a result. Mrs. Doe
was fortunate to have survived this ordeal. Her husband, who had
been out of the house consuming alcohol, discovered her later that
morning. Based on Mrs. Doe's explanation to the police, as well as an
interview from the husband, they suspect a family friend, John M.
This results in the arrest of John M., who adamantly denies having
anything to do with the assault. After some time, John M. is released
and the police continue their investigation, now focusing their efforts
on a neighbor, Scott D.
In preparing to question Scott D., the police interview his former
employer and discover that Scott D. was fired for his poor work ethic,
and made a suicidal gesture as a result of his termination. Addition-
ally, Scott D. was recently divorced; his ex-wife provided investigators
with information about his childhood that she had learned during a
marital counseling session. This information included a history of
child abuse as well as fantasies of beating women. She also mentioned
that Scott D. was taking a drug and had a sexual dysfunction. Scott D.
was a high school graduate with below-average grades who had failed
two community college courses. He was also active in a local church
group, but many of his contemporaries found him immature. Finally,
Scott D. had worked three summers as an auxiliary sheriff at a widelyused state park. In that job, he had arrest authority. During a later
psychological assessment it was determined that his I.Q. level was in
the mid 80s.
not entirely consistent with the pathologist's findings. The autopsy findings belied Buechler's
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The investigators constructed Scott D.'s interrogation based on
this information. The station had a preset room and the investigators
utilized a thematic approach. Scott D. voluntarily arrived at the police
station and waived his Miranda rights after they were read to him. In
fact, he told the police that he was familiar with his rights, and would
be happy to talk with them. For an hour, the investigators and Scott
D. engaged in small talk. He gave no indication that he was even re-
motely involved in the rape and assault on Jane Doe. However, after a
break in the discussion, the investigators began talking to Scott D.
about his troubled background. The investigators spent an hour talk-
ing with him regarding his whereabouts on the night Jane Doe was
victimized. He claimed to have been out of town at a party. The in-
vestigators also made statements to the effect that Mrs. Doe might
have even had it coming to her. He did not respond to these com-
ments, but appeared to listen to them. After an hour, Scott D. asked
to use the restroom and was permitted to do so.
Upon his return, the demeanor of the interrogation changed to a
more accusatory tone. One investigator told Scott D. that a corner gas
station videotape caught him driving out of the neighborhood. This
was untrue. The investigator also told him, "Scott, I know you told us
you would never do something like that, and I think you are generally
a good guy, but I think it's time to tell us the truth." The investigator
then "placed" Scott D. in Jane Doe's bedroom and asked him, "What
did you do next?" At this point, Scott D. told the investigators, "I did
it." He then provided a confession that detailed the type of knife and
frying pan used. He also told the investigators that after the assault,
he had sold his car and burned his clothes. The police were able to re-
cover his car, but it had been thoroughly cleaned by the purchaser.
At trial, the court found Scott D.'s confession to be voluntary. It
also found the confession to be sufficiently corroborated. However,
the jurisdiction had never expressly ruled on the admissibility of false
confession expert evidence under either the social model or medical
model. The defense sought to introduce false confession testimony
from a psychologist who had published in the field. The defense also
sought to introduce psychiatric testimony, alleging Scott D.'s child-
hood abuse left him with diminished capacity and openness to sug-
gestibility. The defense further argued the right to a complete defense
under Crane v. Kentucky, and cited the court to Hall III. The prose-
cution objected to both experts, arguing that the investigators' use of
the Reid technique did not "open the door" to an expert, nor did Scott
D.'s mental condition correlate to a significant character for suggesti-
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bility. The prosecution also articulated opposition based on reliability
and invasion of the province of the trier of fact.
Before conducting a Daubert/Frye analysis, the trial judge mulled
over three possible outcomes. The first potential outcome was to deny
the defense's evidence altogether based on reliability and traditional
trier of fact principles. The second possible outcome was to permit
the defendant to use the psychiatric testimony, provided the prosecu-
tion could, in rebuttal, present relevant profile evidence. Additionally,
under the second option, the false confession "social model" evidence
would be inadmissible. The third potential outcome rested on the de-
fendant testifying, followed by a relevancy determination for both the
social model evidence and the psychiatrist's testimony. However,
should the defense use one or both expert witnesses, the prosecution
would then be permitted to rebut with relevant profile evidence. The
judge then proceeded to hold that social model evidence, because of its
grossly inexact nature, could not assist the trier of fact any more than
lay testimony could.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this Article, a three-dimensional context for false confession
evidence has been analyzed. These dimensions include concepts of
admissibility, the right to a complete defense, and various case law ex-
amples.
There are a myriad of tensions regarding the admissibility of ex-
pert testimony. The right of a defendant to present evidence bearing
on the credibility of his or her confession is subject to evidentiary limi-
tations. One salient limitation is that any expert evidence presented
must have some standard of reliability, even when the evidence is ad-
mitted as "other specialized knowledge." A defendant not suffering
from a narrow list of significant mental illnesses may have to choose
between either testifying or denying himself expert evidence regarding
credibility. This expert evidence may, and should, be suppressed
where the defendant's confession is supported by other facts related to
the charged offenses. That is, the greater the corroboration, the less a
reason for admitting false confession evidence before the trier of fact.
Additionally, there is a tension between the two models of false
confession. The medical model is more likely to be accepted because
of its defined scientific basis. It should be seen as inherently more re-
liable. The social model exists in a vacuum. Despite the research of
Ofshe, Leo, Gudjonsson, Kassin, and Wrightsman, it does not appear
that there is a statistical crisis of false confessions. Moreover, their po-
tential testimony is likely to invade the truth-finding province of the
[Vol. 26:783
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trier of fact. Courts are well situated to deny the social model adher-
ents' testimony for these two reasons alone. However, a third reason
exists. Absent the defendant testifying as to the interrogation condi-
tions specifically overcoming his will, there is little relevancy to social
model testimony. Even where the defendant testifies, social model
testimony should not be permitted. Indeed, the value of the social
model is not that it gives rise to greater expert admissibility as to inter-
rogation psychology. Rather, social model studies should influence
courts in permitting testimony specific to a defendant that is based on
reliable and medically accepted mental illness directly correlative to
suggestibility. While the number of mental illnesses should be nar-
row, such a model reflects the goals of justice and fairness in criminal
law. And, when such testimony is permitted, it seems clear that the
right of rebuttal would include profile evidence as to the defendant's
guilt, because that inclusion reflects the same goals.
